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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE ORACLE OF OMAHA
Warren Buffett (WB) turned Berkshire Hathaway (BH), a textile 
manufacturer with $28 million worth of assets in 1965, the year in which he 
had gained effective control (Schroeder, 2008, p. 276), into one of the 
biggest and most respected American companies (FORTUNE on 
CNNMoney.com), having assets worth $267 billion in 2008, encompassing 
more than 50 subsidiaries in industries as diverse as chocolate production 
(See's Candies), insurance underwriting (GEICO, General RE) and 
fractional jet ownership (Netjets) ("Links to Berkshire Hathaway subs," 
2012).
When WB took effective control of BH and was elected as a director on the 
board, he was only 35 years old. He would later say, that buying it was a 
mistake (Schroeder, 2008, p. 277), even if today his success story is 
inseparably linked to BH. 
Before 1969, WB managed his own partnerships, which he put up with the 
help and the money from friends and acquaintances, who were mostly from 
his hometown Omaha. They existed for 12 years and returned on average 
31% per year (Schroeder, 2008, p. 334). Needless to say, he outperformed  
the major U.S. stock indices by far. Though it seemed he had other plans, his 
professional life was dedicated ever since to his lifework – BH.
Apart from his success as a capital allocator (see figure 1), WB 
became famous for his way of life and his leadership style. He is known to 
be the “burger chomping billionaire next door, who drove an eight-year-old 
Cadillac, lived in his original $31,500 house, and possessed few of the 
tokens of the rich and famous” (Schroeder, 2008, p. 543).
As a leader, his management style is best characterized by 
decentralization, where managers have freedom to lead their respective 
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businesses; by his “Carnegizing”1 (Schroeder, 2008, p. 479) methods of 
giving attention and admiration; his independent thinking; his stern 
discipline to stay in his circle of competence; his engagement for good 
corporate governance (such as his fight for treating stock-options as an 
expense); and by his deep care for his personal as well as BH's reputation 
(Schroeder, 2008, pp. 604; 682; 829; 480; 347). Charlie Munger, his long-
term partner and vice president of BH, often attributes a major part of WB's 
success to the fact that he is a “learning machine” (Schroeder, 2008, p. 632).
Over more than 40 years, BH has become bigger and more complex, but as 
all the free cash flow2 from the subsidiaries is sent to the holding company, 
WB is essentially responsible for the same task as ever: to select possible 
investments.
With more than a half of a century of work experience, having bought his 
first stock at the age of 11 (Schroeder, 2008, p. 65), his knowledge and 
wisdom on investing is without a doubt enormous. His investment style has 
evolved through the years, but the cornerstone of his philosophy can be 
traced back to his student years at the Columbia Business School, where he 
attended an investment class held by Benjamin Graham (BG).
1 The expression Carnegizing stems from Dale Carnegie – a famous American writer
2 Cash available for investments, share buybacks or  payments
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Figure 1. Berkshire Hathaway versus S&P 500 Index. This chart shows the growth of 
10,000 $ invested on 1st January 1965 in Berkshire Hathaway and the S&P 500 Index.   
His teacher was known for two masterpieces, The Intelligent Investor 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003) and Security Analysis (Graham & Dodd, 1996), 
which turned quickly into classic investment text books, and for the small, 
but well-known Graham-Newman Corporation that applied the investment 
techniques he taught (Kahn & Milne, 1977, p. 1; Schroeder, 2008, pp. 139–
150).
Today BG is referred to be the “father of financial analysis” (Kahn & Milne, 
1977, p. 1), having “first proposed the need for a rating designation for 
financial analysts in 1942” ("CFA Program History").  BG's writings and 
teachings laid the philosophical ground for the value investing approach, 
which disciples like Bill Ruane, Walter Schloss, Tom Knapp and WB have 
all applied successfully (Buffett, 1984b, pp. 7–15). Even if WB refers to The 
Intelligent Investor as “by far the best book on investing ever written” 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. ix), his own investment approach has evolved 
over time. Another influence was Phillip A. Fisher's (2003) (PF) book 
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, which in contrast to BG's 
approach, stressed the importance of buying into outstanding businesses for 
the long term and of abstaining from over-diversification (Bierig, 2000, 
p. 36).
WB's incredible success, did not only earn him a lot of regard from his 
partners and BH stockholders, but also the curiosity of the investment 
community and the press. From the Fortune story published in the fall of 
1969 entitled “How Omaha Beats Wall Street” (Schroeder, 2008, p. 334), to 
the BH shareholder meeting turning into the Woodstock of capitalism; WB 
has gradually become a celebrity, known to be one of the most successful 
investors of all time.
His investment decisions are closely followed by the business media; his 
opinions and reflections on the economy and on business are highly 
regarded. CNBC's “Warren Buffett Watch – The Billionaire Next Door” 
("Warren Buffett Watch - CNBC") website evidences the intense interest in 
his person.
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1.2 PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate WB's investment philosophy and 
investment decisions in light of academic knowledge. 
This paper's intent is not to be a biography of WB, or merely to present a 
general overview of his investment philosophy, since already a lot has been 
written about these subjects.
The main questions this thesis wants to answer are the following:
• What are the main influences of BG and PF on WB?
• How is the investment philosophy of WB, BG and PF related to 
academic theory?
• Are WB investments consistent with his teachers and his own 
statements about investing?
• Does a stock-picking formula based on the above findings 
outperform the market?
In the first part, the paper introduces the reader to the ideas of the 
investors who have greatly influenced WB's style of investing. WB's own 
style of investing will also be presented. Mostly primary literature will be 
used to distill the main ideas of BG and PF. Then, the famous Letter to 
Berkshire Shareholders, interviews and other public appearances of WB will 
be used to depict and describe the man's own investment philosophy and 
how it is linked to the approaches of his mentors.
In the second and third part, we present academic theories that are related to 
WB's, BG's and PF's investment beliefs. On one hand, the presented insights 
will cover capital markets research on the value premium (VP); its risk-
based and behavioral finance based explanation. On the other hand, we will 
discuss academic findings on competitive advantage, covering the 
persistence-of-profits literature, the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm (SCPP) and the resource-based view of the firm (RBV).
The third part of the paper deals with the major stock investments of WB. 
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Here we test the different investments for factors identified in the previous 
chapters. We examine if WB investments are consistent with his teachers' as 
well as his own statements on investing, or if they display contradictory 
features. Finally, based on the findings, we construct an investment strategy 
and back-test it for market over-performance (see figure 2).
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Figure 2. Structure of thesis and basic approach of information gathering 
and processing 
EMPIRICAL PART
THEORATICAL PART
Investment principles
- Ben Graham
- Phil Fisher
- Warren Buffett
Value Premium and
 Quantitative Analysis
Competitive Advantage and
Qualitative Analysis
Criterion's to assess WB investments
Portfolio construction
1.3 LITERATURE OVERVIEW
It should be noted that there are 47 books in print, according to Books 
in Print, that carry WB's name in the title (Jones, 2008). 
Alice Schroeder's (2008) The Snowball – Warren Buffett and The Business 
of Life is the official biography and it covers almost every little aspect of his 
private and professional life. Other biographies have been published, such 
as Roger Lowenstein’s (2008) Buffett: The Making of an American 
Capitalist or Andrew Kilpatrick’s (2000) Of Permanent Value: The Story of 
Warren Buffett.
Books with less biographical character are Robert Hagstrom's (1995) The 
Warren Buffet Way and The Warren Buffett Portfolio (Hagstrom & Rudnicki, 
2007) or Marry Buffett's and David Clark's (2008) Buffettology. They 
basically describe his investment philosophy, his education and his 
management style.
Robert F. Bierig's (2000) paper “The Evolution of the Idea of 'Value 
Investing' From Benjamin Graham to Warren Buffett” gives an overview on 
the development of BG's and WB's thoughts on investment.
When searching for academic papers dealing with the examination of 
successful investors, the results are moderate: 
• “Imitation Is the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Warren Buffett and 
Berkshire Hathaway” (Martin & Puthenpurackal, 2008)
Gerald S. Martin's and John Puthenpurackal's paper entitled is worth 
singling out. This paper deals with BH investments on an aggregated level 
and puts his track-record in context to the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). It studies the portfolio's market out-performance and its statistical 
significance. Further the portfolio's characteristics, such as diversification, 
volatility and asset allocation are examined. The major findings are that BH 
invests in large-cap growth, rather than in value stocks. Further the authors 
find that the market under-reacts to the news of a BH stock investment and 
that BH's portfolio out-performance cannot be explained by luck.
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• “Overconfidence, Under-Reaction, And Warren Buffett's 
Investments” (Hughes, Liu, & Zhang, 2010)
This paper examines stock market participants reaction to BH's quarterly 
published holdings report. The authors find that even though prices are 
reacting, the reaction is not complete, since a mimicking portfolio displays 
abnormal returns. Moreover there is a tendency for analysts to downgrade 
stocks after BH reveals an increased stake. This paper also shortly assesses 
whether BH's portfolio performance can be explained by stock market 
anomalies. 
• “Fundamental Analysis, Fixed Effect Valuation and the Relative 
Strength of Operating Margins by Economic Sector. And 
Keynes, The Investment Manager” (Voit, 2004)
This dissertations reasons that the selection criteria of well-known investors 
such as WB, John Neff or Peter Lynch lead them into specific economic 
sectors, since financial ratios are not homogeneous across sectors. Therefore 
whether a given price-ratio is deemed high or low should be evaluated in 
light of the industry or sector to which the company belongs. The findings 
also suggest that the relation between fundamental analysis and security 
returns is different across economic sectors. Further the author suggest that 
the relative strength of operating margins is useful for fundamental analysis.
• “Investing With Ben Graham: An Ex Ante Test of The Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis” (Oppenheimer & Schlarbaum, 1981)
This paper uses stock selection criteria proposed by BG in his book The 
Intelligent Investor in order to construct a portfolio and to test it for positive 
risk-adjusted rates of return. The result shows that an investor could have 
outperformed the market by 2% to 2.5% during the period 1956 through 
1975 only by using publicly available information. These findings are put 
forward against the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis.
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• “Buffett in Foresight And Hindsight” (Statman & Scheid, 2002)
This paper deals with the success of BH and concludes that market 
participants did not foresee WB's capability to beat the market constantly. 
The authors then present other fund managers which also have 
outperformed the market, such as Peter Lynch, Robert Sanborn or William 
Ruane. Finally they argue that even if WB has still the ability to beat the 
stock market, the information about his superior stock picking abilities 
could already be discounted into BH stock price.
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2 ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Having already bought his first stock at the age of  11 (Schroeder, 
2008, p. 65), WB began his investment career very early. As one could 
imagine, his investment approach at that time was not very elaborate. 
To gain more knowledge on the subject of investing, he started reading 
books that deal mostly with technical analysis. But things changed when, at 
the age of 19, he discovered BG's The Intelligent Investor, and subsequently 
enrolled at the Columbia University, where BG himself taught an 
investment class (Schroeder, 2008, pp. 127–128). 
Later in the 1960s, WB was also influenced by another investor and author, 
namely PF (Bierig, 2000, p. 35). WB has stated that PF readings have been 
enormously rewarding to him; that if the influences on his investment 
philosophy could be quantified, 15% may be attributed to Fisher and 85% to 
Graham (Buffett & Jaffe, 1987, pp. 40–45). He also considers Fisher a 
“giant“ (Buffett & Jaffe, 1987, pp. 40–45). 
WB (1967b) argued that there were two approaches to investing: “Buy the 
right company and the price will take care of itself” (p. 2), and “buy at the 
right price and the company will take care of itself” (p. 2). These are the 
qualitative and the quantitative approaches, influenced respectively by PF 
and BG.
In this chapter we will distill the major investment advices of BG and 
PF, and compare them with WB's writings on investment in order to get a 
preliminary understanding of the extent in which he has been influenced by 
either author.
The results from this chapter will subsequently be used to compare them to 
the characteristics of WB's actual equity investments. 
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2.2 BENJAMIN GRAHAM
2.2.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
In the first chapter of his most famous book The Intelligent Investor 
BG stresses the difference between the speculator and the investor by 
stating: “An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis 
promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting 
these requirements are speculative” (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 54). The 
notion of safety is crucial when distinguishing between investment and 
speculation. Safety must be detected and determined by using specified and 
well-established standards (Graham & Dodd, 1996, pp. 53–54). Ultimately 
the most intelligent investment is the one that is most businesslike (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 523).
Regarding security analysis, BG differentiates between two approaches. On 
the one hand there is the qualitative approach, which is more based on 
prediction and stresses factors such as management, prospects, and other 
intangible factors. On the other hand there is the quantitative approach, 
favored by BG, which is based on protection and stresses measurable factors 
such as earnings yield (E/P), price to book ratio (P/B), and dividend yield 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 365). But nonetheless, an investment appraisal 
based on quantitative factors is only useful, when accompanied by a 
qualitative inquiry (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 430).
As opposed to the mainstream view, BG highlights that a common 
stock is not risky because of the existence of price fluctuations. Of course 
there are risks inherent in investment, such as 
a loss of value which either is realized through actual sale, or is 
caused by a significant deterioration in the company's position – or, 
more frequently perhaps, is the result of the payment of an excessive 
price in relation to the intrinsic worth of the security. (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 122)
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The biggest risk is paying an excessively high price for a low-quality stock 
during a business expansion. As the quality of the recent earnings is 
overrated, this would result in an overvaluation (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 516).
In the last chapter of The Intelligent Investor BG describes the “Margin of 
Safety” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 512) (MOS) as the central concept of 
sound investment. It should ensure that the investor only buys securities at 
prices where, even during adverse developments, the investment turns out to 
make a profit. He writes that demanding a MOS based on past data makes 
an exact estimate of the future dispensable (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 513). For common stocks this margin should be given if they are “selling 
for less than the amount of bonds that could safely be issued against its 
property and earning power” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 513).
When it comes to diversification, BG writes that for the defensive 
investor, there should be “adequate though not excessive diversification” 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 114). The number of securities should range 
from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 30 for the defensive investor, since 
he is only investing in well entrenched companies (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 114). For the enterprising investor, he recommends being broadly 
diversified: He gives the example of his own investment firm portfolio, 
which carried at least 100 different securities (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 381).
BG reasons that the concept of MOS and diversification are interrelated, 
since the first ensures that the expected outcome is a profit and the second 
makes sure that the expectation will also materialize (Graham & Zweig, 
2003, p. 518). In his point of view, only a diversified commitment can be 
labeled as investment, whereas highly concentrated portfolios are of 
speculative nature (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 320).
Even though BG acknowledges the fact that it would be intelligent to invest 
only in those stocks for which one has a reliable prognosis, he has a very 
skeptical view towards ones ability to differentiate between “those 
individual forecasts which can be relied upon and those which are subject to 
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large chance of error” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 290). This attitude is one 
that stresses protection more strongly than prediction.
BG writes that security analysis should not be based on market 
forecasts, since history has showed that these forecasts often turn out to be 
wrong. He also refuses the idea of easily followable trading strategies, 
which could give the investor an above average return: “There is no basis 
either in logic or in experience for assuming that any typical or average 
investor can anticipate market movements more successfully than the 
general public, of which he is himself a part” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 190).
Moreover market analysis has several disadvantages compared to security 
analysis: trading costs are higher, the universe of securities is smaller, and 
competition is fiercer since traders try to outguess each other (Graham 
& Dodd, 1996, p. 613).
BG argues that the investor should instead concentrate on what one can 
intelligently assume. He proposes to focus on pricing: that is “to buy stocks 
when they are quoted below their fair value” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 189); rather than on timing, which is the “endeavor to anticipate the 
action of the market” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 189). One 
recommendation that BG gives to investors pertaining to the issue of timing 
is, to never sell a stock after a significant decline and never buy one after a 
significant rise (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 206).
Finally BG gives us a last business rule on which we should act: 
'Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have 
formed a conclusion from the facts and if you know your judgment 
is sound, act on it- even though other hesitate or differ.' […] 
Similarly, in the world of securities, courage becomes the supreme 
virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand. 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 524)
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2.2.2 STOCK SELECTION
BG advises the investor to be very careful when it comes to a growth 
stock. He defines it as “one which has increased its per-share earnings in the 
past at well above the rate for common stocks generally and is expected to 
continue to do so in the future” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 115). The risk 
of these issues is twofold: On one hand, highly profitable growth companies 
are facing the risk of increasing competition and diminishing returns on 
investment (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 433). Thus the analyst may, on the 
basis of extrapolating the latest trend, overestimate the future course of 
business. On the other hand, even if ones forecast turns out to be accurate, 
this may already be discounted into the company's stock price (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 158).
Even though BG acknowledges the fact that “the really big fortunes from 
common stocks have been garnered by those who made a substantial 
commitment in the early years of a company in whose future they had great 
confidence” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 160), he also writes that these 
people had “a close relationship with the particular company” (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 162).
Another matter of concern is that the price of successful companies, which 
tend to have higher price to book values, will depend more “on the moods 
and measurements of the stock market” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 198). 
This could impede the investors ability to asses his investments with the 
necessary calm and detached view of stock-market fluctuations (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 200). 
Another field of suspicion is new issues. The rationale behind this is that in 
the first place new issues are promoted by salesmen, so they require a 
“special degree of sales resistance” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 139). 
Additionally the typical initial public offering is being implemented during 
“'favorable market conditions' - which means favorable for the seller and 
consequently less favorable for the buyer” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 139).
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BG distinguishes between investments suitable for the defensive and 
the enterprising investor. He also notes that the investor or analyst can only 
aim at appraising the approximate value or attractiveness of some securities, 
but certainly not of all (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 299).
The defensive investor should concentrate his stock investments into “large, 
prominent, and conservatively financed” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 114) 
companies. Furthermore a company should be able to demonstrate a track-
record of 20 years of consecutive dividend payments. Also the price 
shouldn't exceed 25 times 7-year average or 20 times last twelve-month 
earnings (Graham & Zweig, 2003, pp. 114–115).
For the enterprising investor BG recommends three different approaches, 
each of them being “different from the policy followed by most investors or 
speculators” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 162) and satisfying an “objective 
or rational test of underlying soundness” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 162).
The first approach consists in investing in relatively unpopular large 
companies. The underlying thought is that if the market overvalues 
companies showing excellent growth, that he will tend to undervalue 
companies “that are out of favor because of unsatisfactory developments of 
a temporary nature” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 163). The reason behind 
selecting large companies is on the one hand because of their “resources in 
capital and brain power” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 163), they have the 
means to withstand economic hardship. And on the other hand it is because 
the market will probably react quicker to improvements than if the company 
would have been small and unknown (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 163).
The second approach is the investment into bargain issues, more precisely 
issues with a value of not less than 50% more than the current price 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 166). The value can be either assessed through 
the multiplication of future earnings by a factor suitable to the specific issue, 
or by calculating the “realizable value of the assets, with particular emphasis 
on the net current assets or working capital” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, 
p. 166).
BG writes that two main reasons for undervaluation are “(1) currently 
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disappointing results and (2) protracted neglect or unpopularity” (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, p. 167).
When calculating the conservative value of a company as a going 
concern, BG advocates the use of average past earnings (Graham & Dodd, 
1996, p. 452). As opposed to current earnings, average earnings have the 
benefit of averaging out results stemming from unusual business conditions, 
exceptional events, and the business cycle (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 429). 
That is why a long and continued track record of good results is always 
more impressive and has more explanatory power than a single observation 
(Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 429).
BG warns against extrapolating past trends into the future. He argues that 
over time, “diminishing returns and increasing competition” (Graham 
& Dodd, 1996, p. 314) amongst other forces “are usually set in motion 
which tend to restore profits where they have disappeared, or to reduce them 
where they are excessive in relation to capital” (Graham & Dodd, 1996, 
p. 35). Furthermore an average that is the result of little swings in earnings 
is of greater informative value than if it were calculated with wildly 
fluctuating earnings (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 429). Even if average 
earnings are not always a good indicator on an individual level, on a 
diversified basis they are related to future earnings: “Capital, experience, 
reputation, trade contracts, and all the other factors which contributed to 
past earning power, are bound to exert a considerable influence upon the 
future” (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 319).
If the company is currently having a setback, the analyst must assure 
himself that the setback is of a transitory nature. In general he should look 
for companies with relatively stable earnings over the last 10 years or more 
with no negative earnings, as well as the size and financial strength to 
endure adversity in the future (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 168).
To assess the stability of a given company, it is not only necessary to study 
its past financial data, but more importantly, to examine the qualitative 
aspects of a business. Only if a company has both good statistical showing 
and favorable qualitative factors is the investor unlikely to be upset by 
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unforeseen events (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 430, Graham & Dodd, 1996, 
p. 38).
The third approach is the participation in special situations. Takeovers 
of promising young companies by larger companies sometimes  necessitate 
high premiums over the current share price. Additionally, the occurrence of 
bankruptcies, break-ups, and lawsuits tend to repel risk-averse investors, 
thereby creating profitable opportunities for the enterprising investor 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, pp. 174–175).
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2.3 PHILIP FISHER
2.3.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
In PF's view, the person wanting to invest in stocks should purchase 
stakes in companies that have a well-thought plan for attaining spectacular 
long-term growth in earnings and some special attributes shielding them 
from new entrants (Fisher, 2003, p. 275). PF is therefore clearly an investor 
focused on the long term and is someone who stresses the need for 
competitive advantage. Even though he recognizes the usefulness of past 
fundamental financial data, for example past  E/P, he also strongly 
emphasizes that the future business performance is what will drive the stock 
price (Fisher, 2003, p. 149). Hence a detailed understanding of the main 
drivers of the given business is what is needed to deliver great results. This 
also explains why past stock price trends aren't a good indicator for 
investment decisions, as they don't reflect the changes which have taken 
place in the meantime (Fisher, 2003, p. 148).
For PF, the risk an investor faces when buying common stocks are 
more related to the characteristics of the business than to the purchase price 
or price fluctuation. As long as a company can show a good rating with 
respect to fundamental qualitative requirements, the investor is only running 
the risk of a temporarily lower stock price (Fisher, 2003, p. 211). The 
highest risk one can incur is buying into securities of low quality at a high 
price due to the current enthusiasm of the financial community (Fisher, 
2003, p. 211). According to PF, even companies of inferior quality, which 
have a stock price that is adequate or even lower than their characteristics 
might suggest, are not appropriate for the careful investor (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 211).
He also states that being insufficiently informed about a given investment, is 
almost as unsafe as being inadequately diversified. (Fisher, 2003, p. 135)
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When it comes to diversification PF (2003) writes that “ a very long 
list of securities is not a sign of the brilliant investor, but of one who is 
unsure of himself” ( p. 144). The amount of diversification an investor needs 
is related to different factors, such as the size of the companies the 
investments are made in, the diversification already achieved within the 
firms, and the cyclicality of the industries.
PF advises to have at least 5 different stocks when investing in large 
established firms, 20 when investing in small, young, high-risk companies, 
and 10 when investing in stocks that rank halfway (Fisher, 2003, pp. 135–
144).
PF recognizes that even if the hard task of picking out the right 
securities is done successfully, and they generate some profit after being 
kept for a long period of time, it is still necessary to give some consideration 
and effort to timing in order to pursue even larger profits. (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 89).
Predicting the short-term development of the stock market is almost 
impossible. Even if in the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, men with good connections to the banking sector, which 
regularly went through boom and bust cycles, could earn tremendous wealth 
with their insider information, these opportunities were becoming very 
scarce with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 35).
The investor should therefore rather concentrate on company specific events 
or developments. In this manner, the investor will be acting on information 
he knows, rather than on market forecasts, which are, in PF eyes, as reliable 
as “the science of chemistry during the days of alchemy in the Middle Ages” 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 90).
PF further describes two special opportunities for the investor to make 
his purchase of growth companies. The first occurs when the stock price 
falls due to reduced earnings, which are caused by trouble arising from 
starting the first full-scale commercial plant and other special sales expenses 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 93). The second arises in a situation where the stock price 
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doesn't reflect the possible increase in earnings occurring from additional 
investments one or two years after a plant is in full-scale operation. These 
investments result in higher sales per additional capital and only little extra 
operational expenses lead to an improved profit margin (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 101). Another extraordinary buying possibility is the fear of an 
international crisis, which pushes the prices of stocks downwards (Fisher, 
2003, p. 145).
In general the investor should be aware of the financial communities' 
appraisal of the industry in which he is interested. Sometimes terrific 
opportunities spring up when an old overoptimistic valuation bubble bursts 
and “under the emotional pressure of falling prices, the negative is 
overemphasized” (Fisher, 2003, p. 210).
When it comes to selling, there are only a couple of  reasons, for example if 
there has been a significant change in the underlying fundamentals; or if the 
company has attained a level where it cannot grow faster than the general 
economy (Fisher, 2003, p. 107). If another security which appears even 
more attractive is found, the selling of the old position could be warranted 
as well (Fisher, 2003, p. 108).
PF gives us also a few common fallacious selling motives, like the fear of a 
general market downturn, or the argument that the stock is currently 
overvalued. In PF's opinion, the exact value of a stock cannot be determined 
with a very high degree of precision, therefore to sell a seemingly 
overvalued position in a great company with good growth prospects in the 
future might lead to missing out a profitable opportunity (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 110). Lastly the most foolish reason to sell a stock is the statement that it 
has gone up more than other stocks, since this argument would imply that all 
companies are of the same quality (Fisher, 2003, p. 111).
PF also discusses the need for the investor to bring certain personal 
traits to the job of managing stock investments. First he refuses the idea that 
a successful investor should be a “scholastic-like investment expert” type 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 79) who would “sit all day in undisturbed isolation poring 
over vast quantities of balance sheets, corporate earnings statements, and 
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trade statistics” (Fisher, 2003, p. 79). Therefore even if intelligence and hard 
work are important attributes, other qualities are also necessary. In PF's view 
the successful investor is rather an independent minded person, fascinated 
with business problems, who cultivates a healthy skepticism towards current 
market beliefs (Fisher, 2003, p. 277). Further he argues that the investor 
should avoid situations where he has only little background knowledge and 
focus on the companies and industries which he feels most comfortable with 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 260).
Finally in the conclusion of his celebrated book Common Stocks and 
Uncommon Profits, PF writes that one of the most capable investment 
professionals he had ever met told him that a good nervous system is the 
most crucial virtue in investing (Fisher, 2003, p. 173).
2.3.2 STOCK SELECTION
PF is clearly a growth stock investor. He writes that, given his 
experience, the return that an investor is earning over a five year period with 
bargain stocks, is only a small fraction of what can be achieved by investing 
into superbly managed growth companies (Fisher, 2003, p. 80).
For him, the issue of dividends is of little concern. He argues that in order to 
grow in size, a company has to invest its earnings in projects with high 
returns. If earnings were to be paid out as dividends, then the company 
would not be able to profit from such beneficial opportunities (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 114). Fisher admits that not all retained earnings lead to increased profits. 
If the management is investing in subnormal projects, then the 
relinquishment of dividends fail to increase the company's worth (Fisher, 
2003, p. 115). Another example of investment that fails to increase the 
company's worth is if the management is forced to buy assets which all 
other competitors are also purchasing. These investments are only beneficial 
to the consumer, but fail to give a single company a competitive advantage 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 116).
The good thing about a high percentage of earnings being retained is that the 
investor is delegating the process of capital allocation to the management of 
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the company. If the management is one of great competence and ability, they 
will tend to find better ways to use the capital in their diverse business fields 
than the investor is able to do on the stock market (Fisher, 2003, p. 119).
PF is likewise advising to keep away from young promotional 
companies. Even though great money can be made if the right one is 
selected, he believes a company should have at least “two or three years of 
commercial operation and one year of operating profit” (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 123) in order for the investor to be capable of making an informed 
appraisal. He suggests that these kinds of investments should be carried out 
by specialized groups who can not only contribute financially, but also bring 
in management skills that are strongly needed for the probable future 
expansion (Fisher, 2003, pp. 123–124).
In his book Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits PF (2003) is 
citing fifteen points to look for in a common stock.
The first two points deal with the growth possibilities of a company. First it 
is important to know if the company has products or services that have a 
meaningful market potential in order to make ample growth in sales 
attainable for the next few years. It is important to keep in mind that growth 
does not occur in a linear fashion. The standard complexities of commercial 
research, the challenges of bringing new products to the market and the 
business cycle are causing the sales growth to occur in “irregular series of 
uneven spurts” (Fisher, 2003, p. 48).
Secondly, it is essential to find out if the management has the determination 
to further develop products or processes that will still make growth possible 
after the old product's potential is exhausted (Fisher, 2003, p. 53).
The third point deals with the effectiveness of the company's research and 
development efforts. In a first step, the investor should compare the research 
and development (R&D) expenditures with the company's sales. This ratio 
can give him some insights when comparing it to those of other competitors 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 54). However, the numbers are to be considered with 
caution and skepticism, since the accounting of R&D expenditures is subject 
to great divergences between companies (Fisher, 2003, p. 55). In a second 
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step, the investor should be able to assess the benefits from these 
expenditures. PF stresses that in order to have effective R&D efforts it is 
necessary to have good researchers, but also outstanding leaders who 
coordinate a team of people. It is essential to have people from the 
production side working closely with people from the sales side to get the 
maximum outcome from the capital invested (Fisher, 2003, p. 55). In order 
to assess the effectiveness of R&D, it is helpful to look at the proportion of 
new products in total sales (Fisher, 2003, p. 59).
The fourth point is about the sales organization. PF stresses that even a 
company with the best research and the most appealing products will not be 
a good investment if its sales organization is not excellent, since it is 
immensely important to make the customer conscious about the different 
benefits of a product in order to sell it (Fisher, 2003, p. 61).
The two following points deal with the profit margin as sales growth will 
not bring significant benefits if there is no worthwhile profit margin. It is 
necessary to compare profit margins in an industry for a series of years to 
find the really great companies. A low profit margin isn't always a sign of a 
marginal company, it can also be caused by increased investments to further 
spur growth (Fisher, 2003, p. 63). However, it is essential to assess whether 
these additional expenditures will ultimately lead to an above average 
growth rate. If not, the investor should shun these marginal low-profit-
margin companies. It is also crucial to evaluate where the above-average 
profit margin comes from. If demand increases and competitive products 
become less appealing, then companies are able to increase prices (Fisher, 
2003, p. 64). The problem is that after some time additional production 
capacities will emerge and profit margins will shrink as prices tend to fall. A 
sustainable profit margin should be the result of a constant review of 
“procedures and methods to see where economies can be brought about” 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 65).
In his seventh point, PF emphasizes the need to have good labor relations. A 
sign of good relations is, for example, having low labor turnover and low 
unionization (Fisher, 2003, p. 66). Another example may also be the waiting 
22
list of job applicants. If there is no general surplus of labor, a long list of job 
applications is a positive indication of how appealing a company is. Finally, 
high wages coupled with good profit margins is normally a sign of good 
labor relations (Fisher, 2003, p. 67).
An aspect of great importance in investing is the management of a company. 
PF devotes four points to this subject. First of all it is indispensable to have 
good executive relations and a good working climate. To achieve good 
relations it is important to promote people based on their ability and 
achievements and not on factionalism (Fisher, 2003, p. 68). It is absolutely 
necessary for a management to sieve out and coach competent and driven 
juniors for future succession (Fisher, 2003, p. 188). Outsiders should only be 
brought in if there is no other existing person able to do the job (Fisher, 
2003, p. 68).
Secondly, salaries should be in line with industry norms and should be 
adjusted regularly. Also the difference between the compensation of the top 
manager and next two or three shouldn't be excessively large (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 189).
Moreover if a company is growing in size it is essential to delegate 
authority. If this is not the case, top management will be overloaded with 
work and lower management won't develop the necessary skills. Long term 
growth in sales can't be achieved without giving people the chance to grow 
their own competence (Fisher, 2003, p. 69).
Lastly a good working climate does include employees at every level. If top 
management can convey the feeling that it is working hard to create a 
conducive and pleasant working climate, this can lead to significant 
productivity gains and cost savings (Fisher, 2003, p. 193).
The two other points concerning management are about candor and 
integrity. PF stresses the importance of good communication between the 
investors and the management team. The concealment of negative 
information may indicate that the management has not “an adequate sense 
of responsibility” (Fisher, 2003, p. 77) or that it has not done enough to 
solve the problem. 
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Finally, it is vital to have a management of indubitable integrity to minimize 
the possibility of misusing the companies' assets for their personal gain 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 77).
The other remaining points are dealing with diverse subjects. For example,   
PF accentuates the need to have good cost analysis and accounting controls, 
but he acknowledges also the limitations to making a worthwhile appraisal 
of it (Fisher, 2003, p. 70). He also points out that the investor should 
investigate if the company has enough financial strength in order not to use 
equity financing: this would dilute existing shareholders ownership (Fisher, 
2003, p. 74).
Apart from the aforementioned points, PF deems good “investment 
characteristics” (Fisher, 2003, p. 198) as important. This concept is closely 
related to what is currently called competitive advantage. One competitive 
advantage that PF mentions is “economies of scale” (Fisher, 2003, p. 200), 
which enables big firms to have a cost advantage. In PF's point of view, 
investors should invest in the leader of a given industry, since most of the 
time they have been able to defend their positions (Fisher, 2003, p. 201). 
However, one of the dangers of large firms is the loss of efficiency, because 
of too many levels of management, in-transparency and inflexibility.
Another competitive advantage is a “well-recognized trade name” (Fisher, 
2003, p. 202) that will set a psychological barrier for consumers when 
thinking of switching producer. Another one  is to have a production that 
“depends on not one scientific discipline but the interplay of two or 
preferably several quite different disciplines” (Fisher, 2003, p. 203).
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2.4 WARREN BUFFETT
2.4.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
WB does not consider himself as a pursuer of either a value or a 
growth investment strategy, since in his opinion, the classical distinction 
between these two strategies is superfluous. In his Letter to Berkshire 
Shareholders in 1992 he states: “What is investing if it is not the act of 
seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid?” He argues that 
growth is a component of value, so the two are not mutually exclusive. 
Like BG, WB negates the academics view that risk conforms to price 
volatility. For him, when investing in marketable securities, one should 
asses risk as a private owner would do. More precisely, the factors that 
should be evaluated are the following (Buffett, 1993):
• the certainty with which the long-term economic characteristic of the 
business can be evaluated 
• the certainty with which the quality of the management can be 
evaluated
• the certainty that management is shareholder friendly 
• the purchase price
• the level of inflation and taxation. 
Risk is thus minimized if the investor chooses “easy-to-understand 
cases” (Buffett, 1993), where the accuracy of his judgment is maximized. 
This means investing in companies that have an understandable business 
model and are operating in stable business environments. These two 
characteristics are needed to evaluate future cash-flows (Buffett, 1993).
WB's strategy is to avoid risk when purchasing an interest in a business. 
However, he welcomes price fluctuation as these market swings create 
extremely depressed prices which are needed to purchase stakes in 
extraordinary business at good or even bargain prices (Buffett, 1992, 
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Buffett, 1993, Buffett, 1997).
Volatility in turn is only a risk if the investor “is forced, by either financial 
or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times” (Buffett, 1987).
An important point in assessing risk is inevitably the purchase price. Even 
for an excellent business, there is some risk of overpayment (Buffett, 1996). 
One of the cornerstones of WB's investment philosophy is: “Never count on 
making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a 
mediocre sale gives good results” (Buffett, 1963).
WB follows a strategy of concentrating his holdings (Buffett, 1966, 
p. 10). His prime goal is to maximize the expected return of the investment 
portfolio, regardless of how much prices are fluctuating, as long as there is 
no long-term risk of losing money. Given his goal of maximizing the 
expected return, he concentrates on the most attractive investment 
opportunities. As manager of the Buffett Partnerships, the maximum that 
WB was willing to put into one security was 40%. In theory, it would be 
great to have a large number of different investment ideas with the same 
expected return, which are not inter-correlated, but in practice this simply 
cannot be done (Buffett, 1966, p. 10).
Further, the more securities you own, the less you can know about each of 
them, which in WB's view, will increase risk (Buffett, 1993). Nonetheless, 
with some strategies diversification is essential. For example arbitrage 
commitments require wider diversification (Buffett, 1993).
In WB's opinion, it is impossible and dangerous to predict the short 
term outlook of the stock market. (Buffett, 1992) He advises the investor to 
concentrate on finding the right price, rather than the right time of a 
purchase. Investment decisions should be made by carefully evaluating 
facts, instead of trying to predict the unknowable (Buffett, 1994).
Even if they cannot be foreseen, sometimes macroeconomic uncertainties 
and other short-term worries lead to a climate of fear. This often creates 
promising opportunities to buy into great businesses whose long-term future 
are predictable. WB states that he neither tries to predict nor to profit from 
such events. However, he made his best purchases during such periods. At 
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other times, a special investment opportunity comes about when a company 
faces a large, single, but solvable problem, as was the case with GEICO and 
American Express. Even so, WB states that he has “done better by avoiding 
dragons than by slaying them” (Buffett, 1989).
WB is a long-term investor, who is willing “to hold any security 
indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on capital of the underlying 
business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the 
market does not overvalue the business” (Buffett, 1987).
In addition, WB says that selling a security is appropriate if the funds can be 
re-invested in even more undervalued or more understandable businesses 
(Buffett, 1987).
2.4.2 STOCK SELECTION
When managing his partnership, WB had 3 distinctive investment 
categories, which he explained in his letters. 
The first category are the “Generals”. These are undervalued securities for 
which no special interest exists, mostly because there is no known catalyst 
that is expected to lead to a quick price appreciation at the time of purchase.
The undervaluation is determined by quantitative factors, although 
qualitative factors, such as good management and a good industry, play a 
considerable role. In this category, WB distinguishes between “Generals-
Private Owner Basis” and “Generals-Relatively Undervalued”. For the 
former, an investment is made if the price is below the value a private owner 
would attach to it. The latter corresponds to securities which are 
undervalued compared to their peer group. Here, WB uses a long-short 
strategy3 to reduce the risk from a general market downturn (Buffett, 1962; 
1963; 1964; 1966; 1967a).
The second category are the “Work-outs”. In contrast to the 
“Generals”, there is a catalyst that eventually leads to a price appreciation in 
the short-term. These are corporate events such as mergers, acquisitions, 
3 A long/short equity strategy consists in buying certain equities and selling others 
(market portfolio, peer group) to hedge the position against certain risks. 
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liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs or self-tenders. Investment actions 
are only taken when the company has officially announced the corporate 
event. The advantage from this category is the predictability of investment 
results and the short-term holding period (Buffett, 1962; 1963; 1964; 1966; 
1967a).
To appraise a typical “Work-out“ situation four questions have to be 
answered:
(1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) 
How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that 
something still better will transpire – for example, a competing 
takeover bid? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take 
place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.? (Buffett, 
1988)
The third investment category is called “Control”. Often control 
investments begin as “Generals”, where the price doesn't appreciate for such 
a long time, that the partnership is able to acquire a significant position. 
Sometimes, when the management or the future of the business is 
suboptimal, the partnership tries to influence the company in order to unlock 
value (Buffett, 1962; 1963; 1964; 1966; 1967a).
These three categories largely remain in place. Only the “Generals-relatively 
undervalued” subcategory has been abandoned after the closure of the 
partnership.
Apart for the “Work-outs” portfolio holdings, WB is searching for 
companies with long term sustainable competitive advantages, who are 
operating in attractive industries, and are run by able, honest, and 
shareholder friendly management. Attractive industries are often 
characterized by stability because this creates an optimal environment for 
companies to build competitive advantage (Buffett, 2007).
The reason for a company to create competitive advantage is to be able to 
earn high returns on its invested capital. If there were no barriers for other 
competitors to pass over, these returns would get competed away (Buffett, 
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2007). This is the case for “commodity businesses” (Buffett, 1982) where 
products are not differentiated. Companies operating such businesses can 
only expect to earn a good return on invested capital if current supply 
cannot meet current demand. Such situations won't last long, because 
additional productive capacity will be installed. Only if actual growth 
outperforms consistently predicted growth, or if “adding capacities requires 
very long lead times because of complicated manufacturing facilities” 
(Buffett, 1982), can a “capacity-tight” (Buffett, 1982) situation persist for an 
extended period of time. The only way to be able to earn high returns is to 
be the low-cost operator with an cost advantage that cannot be replicated 
easily (Buffett, 1982).
In contrast to those “commodity businesses” (Buffett, 1982), WB writes that 
there are “franchises” (Buffett, 1991a). They are characterized by producing 
a good that is seen to be a necessity, that has no close substitute,  and that is 
not affected by price regulation. This gives a company the means to price its 
product aggressively and thus to earn high returns (Buffett, 1991a). 
Therefore, the best business is one that can grow by deploying huge 
amounts of capital at very attractive returns. Unfortunately, however, most 
wonderful businesses are simply not able to reinvest all of their profits at 
such attractive returns. In these cases, capital should be returned to owners, 
either through dividends or through stock repurchases (Buffett, 1978, 
Buffett, 1984a, Buffett, 1992, Buffett, 2007).
In WB's opinion, it is better to buy such wonderful businesses at fair 
prices, than to buy poor ones at bargain prices. When buying poor 
companies at bargain prices, there is commonly “a hiccup in the fortune of 
the business” (Buffett, 1989) that will allow the investor to sell its holding at 
a profit. However to achieve a good return, it is necessary for the hiccup to 
occur early. If it does not, the investor is stuck in a business that reinvests its 
earnings in low-yielding undertakings. Through time, this will severely limit 
the investment's pay-off: “Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the 
enemy of the mediocre” (Buffett, 1989). But even for a great business a too-
high price “can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable 
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business developments” (Buffett, 1982).
To determine if one gets enough value, WB states that earnings yields, price 
to book ratios or dividend yields, are not good enough indicators (Buffett, 
1989): The value of an investment is determined by discounting the future 
cash inflows and outflows (Buffett, 1992).
According to WB, after assessing the business, the second most 
important task when investing in companies is to evaluate the management.
The demands that WB makes toward the management of a company is to 
resist the so-called “institutional imperative”. Management is responsible 
for creating a company that, even if it becomes larger, stays flexible and 
adaptable to market conditions. It is also responsible to foster a culture of 
candor and honesty. Further, management is accountable for capital 
allocation and should resist investing available funds into suboptimal 
projects. The primary goal of management should be to achieve high returns 
on equity and not growth at all cost (Buffett, 1979). They should think 
independently and not mindlessly reproduce the strategy of their peers. 
Nevertheless, despite being endowed with wonderful capabilities, a 
management cannot fulfill wonders if a business has bad economics 
(Buffett, 1989).
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Benjamin Graham Philip A. Fisher Warren E. Buffett
General
Risk
• High price for low-
quality stock during 
business expansion
• Deterioration of a 
company's position 
• Forced sell of security
• High price because 
enthusiasm of financial 
community
• Insufficient information on 
businesses
• Inferior business irrespective 
of price
• Certainty of forecast of long-
term economics of business, 
management quality and 
integrity
• Purchase price 
• Forced to sell
Diversification
• 10 to 30 stocks for 
defensive investor
• Wide diversification (at 
least 100) for enterprising 
investor
• Concentration deemed 
speculation
• Excess diversification is sign 
of incompetence (5 to 20 
issues)
• Dependent on cyclicality of 
business and within company 
diversification
• 5 to 10 business is enough
• Concentrate in the most 
promising
Timing
• Market forecast and 
trading not profitable
• Not sell after significant 
decline and buy after 
significant rise
• Market forecast not possible
• Not sell because significant 
rise
• Sell because other 
opportunities and/or lack of 
growth 
• Market's are unpredictable
Stock 
Selection
Negative
• Growth stocks risk facing 
increasing competition 
and lower ROI
• New issues are pushed 
and promoted
• Bargain issues
• Young promotional 
companies because appraisal 
not possible
Positive 
• Defensive investor – 
large, prominent and 
conservatively financed
• Enterprising investor – 
bargain issues based on 
net current asset value or 
earnings multiplication
• Growth stocks • Undervalued issues
• Work-outs
Catalyst
• Unsatisfactory temporary 
developments, 
disappointing results
• Protracted neglect or 
unpopularity
• Enthusiasm for new plant 
decreases after short-term 
problems
• Neglect of possible additional 
business from add-on 
investments
• Fear of international crisis or  
valuation bubble bursts
• Macroeconomic 
uncertainties
• Large single, but solvable 
problem 
Valuation 
• Net current asset value
• Average earnings
• Stable earnings
• No negative earnings
• Dividend continuity
• Size and financial 
strength
• Qualitative aspect of the 
business
• Barriers to entry: cost 
leadership, trade name, 
complex production technique 
• Growth possibilities 
• Sales organization
• R&D efforts
• Profit margin
• Financial strength
• Management quality
• Information policy
• Sustained competitive 
advantage: differentiation or 
cost leadership
• High returns on investment
Table 1. Summary of investment approaches
2.5 SUMMARY
2.5.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
When arguing that growth is a component of value, WB is connecting 
PF and BG approaches to investing. In fact,  BG does not negate the 
importance of taking into account qualitative factors and growth prospects 
when investing. Additionally, PF does not deny the value of studying past 
financial data. Thus, the investment approaches are certainly not 
diametrically contrary to each other. Both can be characterized as a 
fundamental analysis approach to investing, as opposed to technical 
analysis. Hence, WB is first and foremost a fundamental type of investor.
When assessing risk, both BG and PF state the importance of not 
focusing on stock price movements, but on fundamental factors of the 
investment target. The biggest risk for BG is paying more for a business 
than it is intrinsically worth. PF associates risk less with the price than with 
the fundamental quality of a business and the degree to which an investor 
can fully understand and evaluate it. Both views are shared by WB.
“The Margin of Safety” is the cornerstone of BG's notion of risk. BG has 
stated that at the heart of the concept is the idea of paying such a low price 
that exact forecasting of the future becomes unnecessary. WB's own concept 
seems to be less geared to paying a low price but more towards searching 
for investments that are in one's “circle of competence”.
WB's concept of risk is thus more related to PF's, with the difference that 
good business characteristics per se do not minimize risk, but instead the 
degree in which an investor can evaluate their long-term nature. This is the 
rational motive behind WB's focus on businesses in stable industries.
From the point of view of diversification, WB ideas match more with 
those of PF. Both investors argue that good investment opportunities are 
scarce, therefore only a concentrated portfolio makes sense. Moreover, too 
many stocks in the portfolio can inhibit the investors ability to follow them 
sufficiently: this in turn would increase risk.
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As opposed to WB and PF, BG advocates wide diversification. He admits 
that having only “one stock which you know is going to prove highly 
profitable” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 290) is the ideal, but his viewpoint 
is that a normal investor does not have such reliable forecasting skills. WB's 
concept of  “the circle of competence” (1996) and his focus on stable 
companies with an understandable business model addresses this concern.
BG and PF are very skeptical towards one's ability to accurately 
forecast the business cycle and short-term market fluctuations. Both state 
that an investor should focus on the particular stock rather than on the 
general market. Eventually, he should then be able to identify stocks which 
are mispriced because of short-term surmountable problems or a lack of 
coverage. This reasoning is followed by WB.
However, even if BG and PF refute the usefulness of economic forecasts 
and market outlooks, they indicate that “in times of stress and uncertainty, 
they may not be ignored” (Graham & Dodd, 1996, p. 39). Investment 
actions should then be postponed (Fisher, 2003, p. 102; Graham & Zweig, 
2003, p. 206).
2.5.2 STOCK SELECTION
When selecting stocks, PF only focuses on the long-term, as opposed 
to BG and WB. The two also have an investment category called “work-
outs”, which focuses on short-term investment opportunities.
BG is more interested in net-current-asset bargains (Graham & Zweig, 
2003, p. 391), whereas PF is exclusively interested in high quality 
companies, which he tries to identify through his “scuttlebutt” (Fisher, 2003, 
p. 44) method. WB statements about investment suggest that he favors the 
second approach more and that he identifies time as a major risk factor 
when investing in poor companies at bargain prices.
A point that connects WB and BG selection criterion's, is the emphasis 
on stability. BG approaches stability from the perspective of its worth to 
valuing a security on the basis of its past earnings. Earnings are deemed to 
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be stable if they don't fluctuate wildly around average earnings and are 
considered more reliable depending on the qualitative characteristics of a 
business. WB seems not only to ask for a stable business environment in 
order to increase the dependability of past financial data, but also because it 
allows companies to build sustainable competitive advantages. 
WB stresses the importance of a company having competitive 
advantage, which shields its business from other competitors. This will 
enable it to earn high-returns on invested capital, a criterion often cited by 
WB. His concept of a franchise is closely related to what PF calls good 
“inherent characteristics that make possible an above-average profitability 
for as long as can be foreseen into the future” (Fisher, 2003, p. 198).
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3 INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE CONTEXT 
OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the basis of WB's investment 
decision is fundamental analysis. Through fundamental analysis, both 
qualitative and quantitative factors are considered. This chapter will cover 
these two factors.  
There is no clear-cut distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
aspects. For example measuring the return on equity of a firm requires only 
readily available financial data, thus making it a quantitative factor. 
However, it simultaneously measures a qualitative aspect of a business: how 
efficiently capital is used. Thus the classification is ambiguous. 
To simplify, quantitative factors in this thesis are those where the purchase 
price plays a role, whereas qualitative factors are independent of the 
purchase price. 
The investment philosophy, that fundamental research and simple valuation 
ratios can produce above-average investment returns, leads to the research 
on market efficiency and the VP. 
Additionally, the stock selection process of searching and acquiring 
companies of good quality leads to the research in industrial organization on 
competitive advantage and industry evolution. 
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3.2 THE VALUE PREMIUM AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The pillars of the efficient market theory can be traced back to the 
sixteenth century to Girolam Cardano, a well-known mathematician. Later 
research done by botanist Robert Brown, physicist Lord Rayleigh or 
mathematician Louis Bachelier paved the way for the upcoming efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). Many other authors in the twentieth century 
contributed significantly to the research done on this topic, such as 
Mandelbrot, Friedman, Harry, Samuelson, Working and Osborne. 
Fama's (1970) paper entitled “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work” is the “definitive paper on the efficient market 
hypothesis” (Sewell, 2011, p. 4). He states that “a market in which prices 
always 'fully reflect' available information is called 'efficient'” (Fama, 1970, 
p. 383). In this paper Fama defines the three forms of market efficiency4 and 
conceptualizes methods to test them. Furthermore, he uses Sharpe's work on 
the capital asset pricing model5 to calculate expected returns.
Even before the theory of efficient capital markets permeated 
academia, economists such as J.M. Keynes questioned the rationality of 
stock market investors' decision making processes (Sewell, 2011, p. 3). 
Later in the 1970s studies began to question the validity of the EMH. As 
Jensen formulated it in 1978, “pieces of evidence begin to stack up in a 
manner which make a much stronger case for the necessity to carefully 
review both our acceptance of the efficient market theory and our 
4 There are three forms of market efficiency: weak, semistrong and strong. In the case of 
weak efficiency, only information contained in past stock prices is incorporated into 
current stock prices. If markets are semistrongly market efficient, prices also reflect all 
other published information. And finally the strong form of efficiency is when prices 
reflect all information, published or unpublished.      
5 Sharpe's capital asset pricing model is based on the idea that the risk of a stock can be 
measured by its sensitivity (beta-factor) to the general stock market. The higher the 
beta-factor, the higher the required return.  
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methodological procedures” (Jensen, 1978, p. 95).
In the 1980s and 1990s further research was done to test the EMH. 
These studies focused on observed anomalies such as stock market bubbles 
(Shiller, 2000), momentum strategies (Lo & MacKinlay, 1999), long-run 
return reversals (de Bondt & Thaler, 1985), post-earnings announcement 
drift (Bernard & Thomas, 1989), small-firm effect (Lustig & Leinbach, 
1983) and the value effect (La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).
Not only does WB's investment success contrast against the claims of EMH, 
but he himself has occasionally argued that markets aren't always efficient. 
In his Letter to Berkshire Shareholders of 1988 he cites the profitability of 
the arbitrage strategy carried out at the Graham-Newman Corporation, at the 
Buffett Partnerships, and at BH, as evidence contrary to the EMH. It earned 
above-average returns and used only “highly-publicized events” (Buffett, 
1988). Also in his article The Superinvestors of Graham-And-Doddsville, 
WB bids defiance to the proponents of the EMH by presenting nine different 
investment track records of money managers which were influenced by BG: 
Each one of them has outperformed the market for a significant time period 
(Buffett, 1984b). In addition, the 47-year long investment success of Walter 
Schloss, one of the previously mentioned money managers, was stressed by 
WB in his 2006 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders. Once more he argues that 
this achievement cannot be explained by chance. In reference to the EMH 
being taught at all major business schools, WB sarcastically writes: “Maybe 
it was a good thing for investors that Walter didn't go to college” (Buffett, 
2006, p. 21).
In the following chapter we will present an overview of capital 
markets research related to fundamental analysis and tests of market 
efficiency. The selected research findings will be related to the statements of 
WB and BG. In a first part we will introduce the reader to selected findings 
questioning the validity of the efficient market. In the second part we will 
present the main arguments, despite those findings, in favor of efficient 
markets. The third part will present an alternative view that claims market 
participants aren't always behaving rationally.
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3.2.2 THE VALUE PREMIUM AND MARKET OVERREACTION
This section will begin by briefly defining how the value of a 
company is calculated. Subsequently, we will present three important and 
popular price-ratios: the dividend-yield (D/P), the earnings-yield (E/P) and 
the book-to-market ratio (B/M). Finally, we summarize the main findings of 
selected academic papers that have analyzed the relationship between price-
ratios and investment performance of equity securities.
The value of a company is calculated by discounting its future free 
cash flows. Thus it is given by 3 different variables: following year's 
expected free cash flow, the growth rate of free cash flows and the 
appropriate discount rate:
This valuation approach goes back to the original work of J. B. Williams 
(1938) entitled The Theory of Investment Value and has been cited by WB in 
his 1992 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders.
The value of a common stock, when one assumes that all free cash flows are 
paid out, can also be calculated by discounting dividends instead of free 
cash flows.
It is common to assess a stock's attractiveness by comparing its price to 
dividends, earnings or book value. On the basis that earnings are related to 
dividends through the payout-ratio and book value is connected to earnings 
through return on equity, the use of these ratios can be justified (Damodaran, 
2005). 
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The following popular price-ratios can thus be formed:
• D/P
• E/P 
• B/M
Before presenting some interesting research findings, let us briefly critically 
evaluate the three ratios.
The problem with the D/P is that it merely measures this year's (or 
sometimes next year's) dividend in relation to  the actual price. Thus it 
contains no information about the growth rate of dividends. Growth can 
occur if earnings rise and the payout-ratio stays stable, if the payout-ratio is 
decreased by the management, or by a combination of both. For example a 
company can have nonexistent dividends, such as Berkshire Hathaway or 
Google, and its stock doesn't necessarily need to be expensive.
The critique of the E/P is that it also doesn't include some kind of 
adjustment for growth. Additionally, earnings are more volatile than 
dividends. The business cycle can cause the demand for the product of a 
firm to be at unsustainable levels in the long term. It is also not unusual that 
one-time charges, such as restructuring charges, asset write-downs or profits 
related to the sale of a discontinued business, render current earnings useless 
for valuation purposes. Hence the informativeness of the E/P may 
sometimes be very limited.
Compared to earnings, book-value is more stable. Only in very limited 
cases, such as a massive payout of dividends or a huge stock-repurchase 
program, will book value fluctuate more than earnings. The difficulty with 
the B/M is that most businesses are going-concerns and not in the process of 
liquidations. So the stated value of assets on the balance sheet is not of 
primary importance. What is of importance is the cash flows that can be 
generated through their ownership. Return on equity, which is the 
relationship between earnings and book value, measures how profitable 
assets in place are used. 
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One important reason why businesses sell at different book-to-market ratios, 
is that there are fluctuations in profitability  (see figure 3).
Even if WB has stated:
Whether appropriate or not, the term 'value investing' is widely used. 
Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such 
as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price earnings ratio, or a 
high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they 
appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an 
investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is 
therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his 
investments. Correspondingly, opposite characteristics - a high ratio 
of price to book value, a high price-earnings ratio, and a low 
dividend yield - are in no way inconsistent with a 'value' purchase. 
(Buffett, 1992)
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Figure 3. Industry return on equity (ROE) and B/M. This graph shows the relationship 
between ROE and B/M of U.S. industries using the most recent market price and 
financial statement data as of January 2011. The data is retrieved from the homepage of 
Aswath Damodaran, professor of finance at the Stern School of Business at New York 
University (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html).  
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We still present findings related to the E/P and B/M because there are 
similarities to the methods that WB and his teacher BG have successfully 
applied in the past.
One of the first studies measuring the stock performance of companies 
having low vs. high price-ratios, is done by BG and published in The 
Intelligent Investor. He compares the average annual return from 1937 to 
1969 of companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average having the highest 
and the lowest E/P. The results reveal that cheap (high earnings-yield) stocks 
outperformed the more popular (low earnings-yield) securities and also the  
Dow Jones Industrial Average (Graham & Zweig, 2003, pp. 163–164).
Another early study is entitled “Investment Performance of Common Stocks 
in Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis”. Written by Sanjoy Basu (1977), this paper also deals with the 
relationship between E/P and the price performance of stocks. Compared to 
the study of BG, this paper covers a shorter time frame, 1957-1971, but its 
sample includes 753 firms. The study simulated a one-year buy and hold 
strategy, forming five portfolios with different E/P classes. The main 
findings are that portfolios with high E/P have higher average annual 
returns. Since they don't display higher systematic risk, as measured by the 
beta-factor6, their risk adjusted returns are also superior. The spread in risk-
adjusted returns leads Basu (1977) to state: “These results suggest a 
violation in the joint hypothesis that (i) the asset pricing models employed 
in this paper have descriptive validity and (ii) security price behavior is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis” (p. 680).
Academic researchers have tried to answer this problem either by  
conceiving a new model to measure risk or by asserting that markets behave 
irrationally. These two positions are at the core of the VP debate.
The next study also evaluates the significance of the E/P effect. But 
compared to Basu's previously mentioned paper, “Earnings Yields, Market 
6 The beta-factor measures the sensitivity of a stock to the general stock market.
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Values, And Stock Returns” goes one step further by adding the firm size 
and the January effect7 into the study. Jeffrey Jaffe, Donald B. Keim and 
Randolph Westerfield (Jaffe, Keim, & Westerfield, 1989) attempt to enhance 
prior work by Reingaum (1981), Basu (1977), Cook and Rozeff (1984), and 
Banz and Breen (1986) on the relation between the E/P effect and the firm 
size effect.8 
Stocks are ranked both by size and E/P with a sample period from 1951 to 
1986. One of the observations is that companies with high E/P have 
typically lower market-values and vice versa, and the portfolio with the 
highest E/P has the lowest beta-factor and the highest return. Finally the 
regression of stock performance on E/P and size shows that both effects are 
significant.
As mentioned earlier, not only the E/P, but also the B/M has been used to 
classify stocks as either value or glamor. Prior research by Rosenberg, Reid 
and Landstein (1985), Fama and French (1995), and Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) has confirmed abnormal returns of high book-to-market 
portfolios.
In 2000 Joseph D. Piotroski published “Value Investing: The Use of 
Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from 
Losers”. From the observation “that less than 44% of all high BM [book-to-
market] firms earn positive market-adjusted returns” (Piotroski, 2000, p. 3), 
he developed a method to discern between weak and strong firms. However,
unlike the other studies presented earlier, this paper uses fundamental 
analysis. 
In the tradition of BG and David Durand (Durand, 1957), Piotroski argues 
that high B/M companies are more susceptible to financial statement 
analysis, since their values aren't so dependent on future growth 
opportunities. He uses fundamental factors that inform about the 
profitability, the financial flexibility and the operating efficiency of a firm,  
7 The January effect is a stock market phenomenon which is characterized by abnormal 
prices increases during the first month of the year.
8 The firm size effect, which says that low market value enterprises have abnormal high 
risk-adjusted returns, can be traced back to Rolf W. Banz Banz (1981). 
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to form a composite score. The fundamental strategy is able to sort out weak 
companies from the high B/M portfolio and substantially increase the return.
Joseph D. Piotroski's method of selecting companies is reminiscent of what 
BG writes in the chapter Stock Selection for the Defensive Investor in the II. 
The investor should:
apply a set of standards to each purchase, to make sure that he 
obtains (1) a minimum of quality in the past performance and 
current financial position of the company, and also (2) a minimum of 
quantity in terms of earnings and assets per dollar of price. (Graham 
& Zweig, 2003, pp. 347–348)
Another principle of BG is the use of average earnings instead of current 
earnings to measure the attractiveness of a stock. This approach was 
followed by Keith Anderson and Chris Brooks (2006) in their paper entitled 
“The Long-Term Price-Earnings Ratio”. Having observed that past studies 
only use the traditional E/P, the authors perform a regression of United 
Kingdom listed companies' stock performance on various earnings-yield 
statistics. 
They form 8 different E/P statistics: the first is calculated taking only 
current earnings and the last using the average earnings of the last 8 years. 
All portfolios having the highest earnings-yield perform better than their 
low earnings-yield counterpart, independent of which earnings-yield 
statistic is employed. Although it isn't increasing monotonically, the gap 
widens with the usage of earnings-yield statistics where more past earnings 
are taken into account. 
The authors use two different samples: one with all available data and 
another where only companies having eight years of positive earnings are 
considered. They observe that stock returns for the companies in the highest 
E/P portfolio increase if the investor requires eight years of positive 
earnings. That criteria is similar to what BG refers to, when he insists the 
enterprising investor should require a company to have gone ten years 
without experiencing negative earnings (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 168). 
After testing other E/P statistics, the study finds that the one which worked 
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best in the 1975 to 2003 period is calculated by taking the average earnings 
of the present, as well as that of 8 years ago. 
This paper shows that the employment of average earnings might be 
superior to the use of current earnings. 
The studies presented above deal with the return predictability of 
price-ratios. Even if this approach yields better results for smaller 
companies, the E/P and B/M effect are nevertheless also significant after 
controlling for the market value of firms. Additionally the last two papers 
show that an increase in average returns can be achieved by adding 
fundamental analysis and average earnings to the stock screening process. 
Before proceeding to the next section, a last paper is introduced. Unlike the 
previous ones Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard Thaler (1985) don't use 
price-ratios in their study. In “Does the Stock Market Overreact” the authors 
examine the investment performance of portfolios composed of price 
winners and price losers during variable time periods before portfolio 
formation. “'Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell 
one immediately after a substantial drop'” (Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 206) 
reads a motto of BG in The Intelligent Investor. Congruently in this study 
the portfolio that composed of prior losers displays higher returns than the 
one composed of winners.
After this introduction of the so-called VP, the next chapter deals with 
the explanation of this phenomenon.
3.2.3 A RISK BASED EXPLANATION
In 1992 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French (1992b), two 
professors from the University of Chicago, published one of the most 
influential papers in finance. In “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns” they perform a cross-sectional regression of equity returns on 
variables that have been been found to be relevant in prior studies. 
Starting from the observation that the beta-factor from the traditional 
capital asset pricing model didn't explain very well past returns, they 
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attempt to pick out variables with higher explanatory power. The variables 
tested are market capitalization, B/M, E/P and leverage. Ultimately for the 
1963 – 1990 period, the B/M and the size factor subsume the information of 
the two other variables.
In a later paper entitled “Common Risk Factors in The Returns on Stocks 
And Bonds” Fama and French (1992a) introduce the three-factor pricing 
model9. The model has R²10 close to one, thus explaining a high percentage 
of the common variation in stock returns.
The SMB (small minus big) factor captures the size premium. It is 
calculated by taking the average return of small stocks and subtracting the 
average return of the biggest stocks. The two portfolios are constructed so as 
to be free of any influence caused by the B/M effect.
The HML ( high minus low) factor captures the B/M premium and is 
similarly constructed as the SMB factor.
The intuition behind the model is that the SMB and HML portfolios are 
loading on risk factors that are not accounted for in the traditional capital 
asset pricing model. Based on this model, a stock having a low B/M could 
also theoretically be positively influenced by the HML factor. The reason is 
that its return is not based on its characteristic (B/M or firm size), but on its 
sensitivity to the SMB and HML factor.
But what is the economic logic behind this model? What risks are SMB and 
HML capturing?
In the inter-temporal models of Merton (1973) and Breeden (1979) the 
market return does not fully capture all the risks a stock is exposed to. Given 
the high explanatory power of the Fama-French model and assuming the 
market is efficient, the SMB and HML factors should capture the risks not 
accounted for in the traditional capital asset pricing model.
9 The three-factor model: Expected (return of security A) = (risk-free return) + (beta-
factor)*(expected (return of general market) – risk-free return) + (size-factor)*SMB + 
(value factor)*HML. It is an extension of the capital asset pricing formula. 
10 R², also called the coefficient of determination, measures the goodness of fit of a tested 
model. It is the ratio of explained variation to total variation and is such that 0 < R² < 1.
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K. C. Chan and Nai-Fu Chen (1991) argue in their paper “Structural and 
Return Characteristics of Small and Large Firms” that smaller firms “are 
less efficiently run and have higher financial leverage,”  which possibly 
leads to a “difference in accessibility to external financing.” They also 
drastically cut dividends more often then large companies. The authors 
argue that smaller firms are therefore qualitatively marginal firms. It should 
be noted that this conclusion is only drawn for stocks quoted on the New 
York stock exchange. Similarly Fama and French (1995) observe that high 
B/M and small companies are less profitable.
Maria Vassalou and Yuhang Xing (2004) notice that the size and the B/M 
characteristic are connected to the risk of default. Their findings suggest that 
the size and the B/M effect is only existent for firms that are subject to a 
high risk of default. They also notice that stocks subject to default risk only 
earn higher returns then their low risk counterparts, if they display the 
appropriate B/M and size characteristics.
Additional to this distress risk, Kevin Aretz, Söhnke M. Bartram and Peter 
F. Pope (Aretz, Bartram, & Pope, 2010) identify other macroeconomic 
factors related to HML and SMB factors. They indicate that HML serves as 
proxy for changes in GDP growth expectation, unexpected inflation, the 
slope and the average level of the term structure of interest rates, and the 
exchange rate. SMB captures information related to the previously 
mentioned default risk, level and slope of the term structure, and the 
exchange rate.
Since the Fama-French model received a lot of attention from financial 
researchers in the early 1990s, it has earned not only praises, but also 
criticism.
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) attack the findings on various grounds:
• Data mining or data snooping: which states that the relationship is 
due to chance
• Survivorship Bias: which argues that the used data is biased toward 
surviving firms
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• Beta estimation problem: which says that the use of annual instead 
of monthly betas would be more suited
The attacks are subsequently refuted. Fama and French (1998) found 
evidence of the B/M effect in other developed countries as well as in several 
emerging countries. This study serves as out-of-sample proof of the value 
effect. And Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) rebut the survivorship 
bias argument by constructing a revised data sample.
Another noteworthy critics comes from Kent Daniel and Sheridan Titman 
(1997). In contrast to Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) they don't 
challenge the VP, but the factor model developed by Fama and French. 
Their findings suggest that the average investment returns are better 
explained by directly linking them to the firms B/M and its size, since after 
controlling for the two parameter values, the exposure to the SMB and HML 
factors is modest.
This section presented the risk-based explanation of the value effect. 
The Fama-French model was briefly explained and different possible risk 
factors introduced. The next section introduces a different set of 
explanations. These come from the field of behavioral finance and argue 
that investors' decision errors have a causal relation to stock market 
anomalies.
3.2.4 A BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATION
This section deals with explanations for the VP based on behavioral 
finance findings. The section starts with a brief introduction to the field of 
behavioral finance.
The field of Behavioral Finance is popular since the 1990s, but its 
origins can be traced back to the nineteenth century: Gustav le Bon (1896), 
a French psychologist, and Charles Mackay (1956), a Scottish journalist, 
publish two books on the psychology of crowds. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century George Charles Selden (1965) writes Psychology of The 
Stock Market where he connects finance, sociology and psychology.
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Behavioral finance is an extension of the classical approach to financial 
market theory. In contrast  to the former, where economic agents are 
assumed to be rational individuals, the field of behavioral finance introduces 
cognitive and social psychologists findings on bounded rationality. The 
famous homo-economicus is replaced by a more-realistic individual whose 
judgments, beliefs and decisions are biased.
Richard Thaler and Nicholas Barberis (2002) identify two broad research 
categories of behavioral finance: psychology and limits to arbitrage.
Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tversky, two Israeli psychologists are at the 
forefront of the new field of behavioral economics, to which behavioral 
finance belongs. Together with other researchers they identify a wide range 
of cognitive biases, such as:
• Overconfidence: people overestimate their abilities 
• Framing: how a situation is presented influences peoples decision
• Heuristics: the use of rule of thumb or intuition to solve a problem
• Representativeness: people do not judge based on probabilities, 
but on stereotypes
• Availability: people use mostly information that comes easily to 
mind
• Anchoring: people start from an anchor and this influences their 
decision (Hirshleifer, 2001)
Given these cognitive biases, irrational market participants drive prices 
away from their fundamental value. In the tradition of Milton Friedman 
(1953), advocates of the EMH argue that these deviations are corrected by 
rational traders. Yet studies show that there are instances were irrational 
prices can be sustained for a prolonged time. The reasons that circumvent 
arbitrage traders to bring prices back to their fair value are:
• Risk:
• Fundamental risk: there is no substitute security to hedge the 
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position, and if there is one, the arbitrageur still faces the risk of 
company specific shocks
• Noise trader risk: the mispricing becomes more severe and the 
arbitrageur has to prematurely close his position at a loss
• Costs:
• Trading costs: Commissions, bid-ask spread and price impact 
lowers the expected return
• Short-sale constraints: legal constraints prohibit certain fund 
managers from short-selling or a security is too costly to borrow 
or simply not available
• Other costs: costs of identifying and exploiting a mispriced 
security (Barberis & Thaler, 2002)
So, if the VP is due to mispricing, Phalippou (2008) in line with Barbaris 
and Thaler (2002), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Shleifer (2000) argues 
that two questions have do be answered. To begin with, there must be an 
explanation why prices have deviated from their fundamental value in the 
first place. Secondly, there must be a reason why arbitrage traders did not 
correct the mispricing promptly.
Starting from the assumption that market participants extrapolate past 
growth into the future, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) form two 
set of stocks: value and glamor. 
Glamor stocks are those with high past sales growth and with high expected  
future growth as measured by the cash flow to price multiple. A value stock 
is the opposite: low sales growth in the past and also low growth 
expectations for the future. They contrast this method to the classic B/M 
classification, where the reliance on a single ratio doesn't produce a clear-cut 
differentiation between value and glamor stocks.11
This contrarian strategy has a better performance than the classic value 
11 For example, if extraordinary costs diminish earnings substantially, the earnings yield 
can be temporarily low. Thus when only using a single ratio, the stock would be 
wrongly classified as glamour.   
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strategies based on single valuation metrics. The authors notice that prices 
of glamor stocks, for which investors anticipate high future growth, are too 
optimistic based on the actual observed growth rates. Similarly La Porta 
(1996) shows that a portfolio of stocks in which analysts expect high 
earnings growth, actually performs worse than one with low expected 
growth.
This is one reason for the success of the extrapolation model. As BG writes 
in The Intelligent Investor:
Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company 
has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size 
makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult. At some point 
the growth curve flattens out, and in many cases in turns downward. 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 158)
This finding suggests that value strategies perform above-average, because 
investors make biased growth forecasts. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1997) put forward the explanation that investors are victims of two 
information updating biases: conservatism and representativeness.
For value firms, good news isn't sufficiently incorporated into future cash-
flow forecasts. Due to conservatism, investors expect earnings to be more 
mean-reverting than is warranted.
Contrariwise for growth firms, a sequence of good news is the catalyst for 
an excessively rosy forecast. Here investors, due to representativeness, 
wrongly assume that earnings are trending, whereas in actuality, the process 
is better described by a random-walk12.
A second  potential reason is that private investors are more interested in 
glamor stocks, because they hope for large gains in a short period of time, 
something the value strategy's few extra percentage points of return cannot 
provide.
Institutional investors might as well be irrationally inclined toward buying 
glamor stocks. The fear of losing ones credibility and reputation could lead 
them to buy mostly securities that are in vogue. As John Maynard Keynes 
12 A random-walk is a process of successive uncorrelated steps. 
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put it: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
After observing that the difference in beta-factors cannot explain the 
difference in return, to evaluate whether this contrarian strategy is risky, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) study the periods of under-performance. Among 
other results, they found that, over an interval of five years, it constantly 
outperforms the market. Further, they find no evidence that value stocks 
under-perform glamor stocks in “bad” states of the world: neither during 
recessions nor during periods with the worst stock market performance. This 
strengthens the claim that the contrarian strategy earns additional returns 
without assuming more risk.
Further evidence for the extrapolative bias is given by Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok (2003). In their paper the authors study “The Level and 
Persistence of Growth Rates.” The data suggests that firms with persistent 
above earnings growth rates are very rare. As one would commonly assume, 
persistent sales growth is found more often: the authors reason that sales 
growth is achieved more easily, because product price decreases or 
production capacity enlargements can increase sales, but the repercussion on 
profitability is ambiguous.
Akin to these results, the authors find that on one hand high past sales 
growth heralds above average sales growth in the future, but that on the 
other hand past earnings growth isn't a good indicator for good future 
earnings performance. Valuation ratios are also not a good indicator for 
future earnings growth; they actually reflect past growth rates. Furthermore, 
analysts' long-term growth estimates tend to exhibit a lack of predictive 
power.
All in all, persistent earnings growth is very rare and neither past growth 
rates, valuation ratios, nor analysts forecasts are good predictors. 
To cast even more doubt on the risk-based explanation for the VP, using the 
same classification criteria for value and glamor stocks as in Lakonishok et 
al. (1994), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) study the 
returns of portfolios around earnings announcement dates. Value stocks have 
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higher event returns than nonevent returns. This possibly indicates that the 
market is positively surprised. Likewise it could be that if “a high fraction of 
the annual uncertainty about a stock is realized around quarterly earnings 
announcements, then perhaps a disproportionate share of the risk premium 
is as well” (La Porta et al., 1997, p. 870). The result is therefore 
inconclusive.
Yet in contrast to value stocks, glamor stocks not only display lower event 
returns than nonevent returns, event returns are even negative. The 
aforementioned risk premium hypothesis (higher event returns than 
nonevent returns for value stocks) predicts otherwise. Thus the authors 
argue that the negative returns of glamor stocks around earnings 
announcement dates are due to the correction of the markets optimistic 
earnings expectations.
Conservatism, representativeness, herd behaviour, and other cognitive 
biases seem to be the reason for the success of contrarian strategies. Ludovic 
Phalippou (2008) furnishes further evidence for the extrapolation bias, as 
well as results that detect limits to arbitrage as a cause for the VP. Instead of 
taking size as a second independent variable, the author uses institutional 
ownership. The reasons are twofold: firstly, institutional ownership should 
be negatively correlated with the extrapolation bias, since institutional 
managers have better informational resources and are more skilled then 
private investors. Secondly, the costs of arbitrage are lower for stocks with 
high institutional ownership, since these stocks tend to be more liquid and 
are more widely available for short-sellers.
The results are intriguing. From 1980 to 2001 the VP is only present in the 
low institutional ownership segment, which represents only 7% of total 
market capitalization. Additionally, the VP is concentrated in the largest 
stocks in the low institutional ownership segment and the “size has no 
marginal explanatory power over ownership in explaining the performance 
of growth versus value stocks” (Phalippou, 2008). 
Thus, by employing findings from psychology and sociology, we are able to 
better explain and understand stock returns. In this case, investors cognitive 
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biases and the limits to arbitrage form two well-documented explanations.
3.2.5 SUMMARY
“Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they 
went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference 
between these propositions is night and day” (Buffett, 1988).
As summarized in the second chapter, BG, PF and WB state that 
fundamental research and analysis can lead to above-average investment 
returns. PF favors research that is more skewed toward qualitative factors, 
whereas BG's focus lies more on quantitative factors. 
BG has produced one of the first studies on investment returns based on 
fundamental research, showing that stocks with high E/P outperform stocks 
having low E/P. 
Subsequent studies showed that stocks earn higher returns if amongst other 
things, they have high average E/P, low institutional ownership, low past 
and anticipated growth, no analysts following them, and are financially 
strong.
The capital asset pricing model and its beta-factor which in theory captures 
risk, can't explain the out-performance of most value strategies. Hence there 
is either a problem with the CAPM model or markets aren't efficient at all 
times.
Some academic researchers attribute the out-performance of the so-called 
value stocks to their riskiness. They find that value stocks face higher 
distress risk, are of marginal profitability, and cut dividends more often. 
They may also have higher risk exposure to changes in macroeconomic 
variables such as growth and inflation expectation, or the level and slope of 
the interest curve. This reasoning essentially argues that markets are 
efficient, but that the capital asset pricing model is misstated.
Other scholars suggest that market anomalies are due to investors cognitive 
biases and limits to arbitrage. Investors are bad at updating their beliefs. 
They suffer from conservatism and representativeness.  Additionally risk 
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and cost factors prevent arbitrageurs from correcting prices. These are the 
sources of contrarian strategies superior returns.
The connection of BG's approach, namely buying companies with 
prices lower than the net asset value, to the other univariate indicators of 
mispricing is evident. In contrast, WB's strategy is more complex because it 
doesn't rest on a single indicator of value. His investment philosophy 
contains lessons from behavioral finance; he is willing to buy during times 
of elevated pessimism and prepared to make contrarian investments.
The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times 
pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to 
do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism 
but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the 
enemy of the rational buyer. (Buffett, 1990)
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3.3 COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of competition is central to the field of economics and 
business. Although Adam Smith is thought to have introduced it to the field 
of economics, other authors such as Becher, Boisguillebert, Cantillon, 
Turgot or Steuart had already addressed it by the time the Wealth of Nations 
was written. Competition was then associated with rivalry and bargaining, 
where price was a variable component. It assured the “allocative efficiency 
in resource use” (McNulty, 1967, p. 397) and was elevated “to the level of a 
general organizing principle of economic society” (McNulty, 1967, p. 396), 
replacing “ethically and politically oriented price administration as the focus 
of economic analysis” (McNulty, 1967, p. 396).
Later the mathematical economists of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
such as Edgeworth, Jevons, Clark, Cournot or Knight took a different 
approach. In contrast to Smith, who saw competition as a dynamic process 
and a business behaviour, Cournot's static approach was all about the result 
– an equilibrium state of the world were “competition in the Smithian sense, 
was ruled out by definition” (McNulty, 1967, p. 398). This situation, or 
rather market structure is called perfect competition.
In capitalistic economies such as those prevalent in the United States, 
Germany or Japan, most markets aren't perfectly competitive. The properties 
of a pure and perfect market, such as infinite buyers and sellers, no barriers 
to entry or exit, and homogeneous products, are seldom achieved. One can 
cite the world commodity market as coming close to being perfectly 
competitive (Bannock, Baxter, & Davis, 2003, p. 295).
But even if markets aren't perfect and firms temporarily earn abnormal 
profits, profit seeking entrepreneurs or managers, by allocating resources 
away from loss-generating activities to more promising and lucrative 
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endeavours, should bring these returns back to their long-run competitive 
level. However, these competitive levels of profits are seldom reached as 
new innovations arise in the field of production processes or product 
development, and changing consumer tastes or supply and demand shocks 
appear repeatedly. 
This is the dynamic of creative destruction as described by Schumpeter., 
where the outlook for healthy profits leads to new innovations which in turn 
make older investments obsolete. Only the innovator can reap a short-lived 
gain, before a flock of imitators enter the market and trample down his 
carefully cultured profit plant (Roberts, 2001).
Research by strategic management scholars and industrial organization 
economists has highlighted the functioning of this dynamic competitive 
process by studying the persistence of companies profits and the sources of 
firm profit differences. Bain (1956) and Mann (1966) focused on industry 
profitability, whereas later researchers such as Mueller (1977) and Yurtoglu 
(2004) put individual firm profit persistence at the center of attention. At the 
same time, people such as Porter (1985) and Peteraf (1993), among others, 
searched for factors that provide a company with competitive advantage in 
order to earn continual abnormal profits.
WB has stated that “long-term competitive advantage in a stable 
industry is what we seek in business” (Buffett, 2007, p. 6). He did not 
always have this principle. In the past he practiced the so-called “cigar butt” 
(Buffett, 1989) approach to investing: This involved buying companies with 
non-compelling long-term profitability prospects but at such a bargain price 
that, sooner or later, the investor is able to sell them at a reasonable profit:
“A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not 
offer much of a smoke, but the 'bargain purchase' will make that puff all 
profit” (Buffett, 1989).
The problem with this approach is that, if the share price doesn't increase 
sooner, but rather later, the investor is stuck with a business where profits, 
that are not payed out in the form of dividends or share buybacks, are 
reinvested at very low rates of investment. BH, back then a textile 
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manufacturer competing with foreign low-cost producers, was such a cigar 
butt found on the street (Buffett, 1989).
Influenced by PF and Charles Munger, WB later changed his investment 
approach and now searches for high-quality companies that have high 
returns on investment. But since “high profit margins may be compared to 
an open jar of honey owned by the prospering company. The honey will 
inevitably attract a swarm of hungry insects bent on devouring it” (Fisher, 
2003, p. 200). So in order to keep competitors at bay, WB requires 
companies to have an “enduring 'moat'” protecting the “business 'castle'” 
(Buffett, 2007, p. 5).
In this chapter we will deal with the research on competitive 
advantage. The findings will be linked to statements of WB and PF. In the 
first part we will present findings of the persistence of profits literature. In 
the second part we will cover strategies and factors identified by researchers 
that lead to sustainable competitive advantages. The third part will deal with 
industry evolution and technological change.
3.3.2 THE PERSISTENCE OF PROFIT RATES
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the examination of 
profit rates at both firm and industry level is crucial towards understanding 
the dynamic of market economies. Even though “the theory of profit has 
remained one of the most unsatisfactory and controversial divisions of 
economic doctrine” (Knight, 1921, p. 12), the different economic schools 
agree to a certain extent that competition should guide profits to competitive 
levels, where there is no profit in the long run (Knight, 1921, p. 12). The 
neoclassical approach is static, whereas the classical as well as the Austrian 
approach is dynamic (Cable & Mueller, 2008).
McNulty (1968) elegantly compares these two concepts to principles one 
can encounter in physical science. The dynamic process of competition is 
analogous to the force of gravitation, were “resources 'gravitate' toward their 
most productive uses” (p. 643). The static situation is comparable “to the 
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idea of a perfect vacuum; it is not an 'ordering force' but rather an assumed 
'state of affairs' - one which, although an 'unrealistic', - indeed, unrealizable, 
- abstraction, is nonetheless a useful analytical device” (p. 643).
The static view of competition and its reasoning is at the center of 
Bain's  research on inter-industry performance differentials. His seminal 
work contributed immensely to the creation and propagation of the SCPP 
and the field of modern industrial organization (IO) (Sutton, 2007).
Influenced by the writings on perfect competition, as well as on imperfect 
competition by Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933), Bain (1951) 
analyzes the relationship between industry structure (concentration) and 
performance (profitability) (Mosca, 2009). He reasons that in the presence 
of entry barriers, collusion between incumbent industry members is 
facilitated. They are then able to “persistently raise their price above a 
competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry” (Bain, 
1956, p. 3).
Nevertheless, as argued Mueller (1977), in a world where products and 
processes within industries are not homogeneous, the definition of an 
industry and its structure turns out to be a difficult task.
Mueller and Raunig (1998) found that where companies are heterogeneous 
within an industry, the traditional reasoning of the SCPP, that industry 
concentration enhances profitability, fits badly.
Driven by the pursuit of profits, firms constantly innovate products and 
processes and try to differentiate themselves from one-another. In this 
Schumpeterian like scenario comparing firm profits is more reasonable 
(Cable & Mueller, 2008).
Clearly WB pays attention to both inter- and intra-industry 
profitability. On one hand he mentions TV stations or the breakfast cereal 
industry as being industries with good economics, whereas he regards the 
textile or the airline industry as being poor performers (Buffett, 1979). “'A 
horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse – not a remarkable 
mathematician.' Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly 
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within its industry is a remarkable textile company – but not a remarkable 
business” (Buffett, 1985).
The difference in average profitability of selected U.S. industries between 
1992 and 2006 depicts this phenomenon (see Figure 4). Also Kessides 
(1990) finds strong evidence for permanent U.S. industry profitability 
differences during the period 1967-82. Other studies dealing with industry 
profitability generally found that no long-run equalization tendency can be 
detected (Schohl, 1992).
On the other hand WB also emphasizes that firms, by following certain 
strategies, can produce healthy profits in very competitive environments. He 
characterizes GEICO, by following a low-cost strategy in the very 
competitive auto-insurance industry, as being such an outstanding company.  
This persistent intra-industry profitability difference has been shown by 
Mueller (Mueller, 1986; Mueller & Cubbin, 1990; Mueller & Raunig, 
1998), Waring  (Waring, 1996) or Porter (Porter, 1979b).
Since WB's investment approach consists of investing in firms that are 
able to sustain their competitive advantages and thus their abnormal profits 
in the long run, the main focus of attention is on the time dependency of 
firm profits. The static observation that profitability differs between firms or 
industries does lead one to dismiss the perfect vacuum idea. Also cross-
sectional studies can lead to insights on the influence of firm- or industry- 
specific variables on firm profitability.
However to check the validity of the Schumpeterian competitive scenario 
and to determine whether firms achieve sustainable superior performance 
and to gain insights on its origin,  studies on profit persistence have to be 
consulted.
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The general finding of empirical studies in this branch of research, including 
Mueller (1986), Geroski and Jacquemin (1988),  Droucopoulos and Lianos 
(1993), Goddard and Wilson (1995), and Yurtoglu (2004) is that some firms 
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Figure 4. Average profitability of selected U.S. industries between 1992 and 2006. The 
profitability is measured by the return on invested capital (ROIC). ROIC = (Earnings 
before interest and taxes) / (Average invested capital – excess cash). Adapted from “The 
Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy,” by Micheal E. Porter, January 2008, 
Harvard business review, pp. 79-93.
do earn above normal profits, but that generally a process of convergence 
takes place. However the characteristics of this convergence process shed 
some doubt over the theories of the neoclassical and Austrian school of 
economics or D'Aveni's (1994) model of hypercompetition (Wiggins & 
Ruefli, 2002).
Wiggins and Ruefli (2002) analyzed 6772 firms in 40 industries over 25 
years and found that in 18 industries there were at least one firm achieving 
superior performance for 20 or more years. Members of this outstanding 
group of companies are familiar names such as McDonald’s Corp, Hewlett-
Packard Co., United Parcel Service AM Inc., Hilton Hotels  Corp. or 
Rubbermaid. Acquired by BH in 2001, Benjamin Moore, a paint and allied 
products manufacturer, also belongs to this group. Furthermore 350 
companies, representing 5% of the sample, delivered 10 or more years of 
persistent above-average profits. Worth singling out are American Home 
Products, Eli Lilly & Co. and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing 
Company, which have sustained almost 50 years of excellent performance.
Mueller (1986) in his study of 600 large U.S. industrial firms over the 
period 1950 to 1972, finds that the process of converging back to 
competitive levels is not complete. Not only do companies converge to 
different long-run profit levels, the convergence speed is also dissimilar. 
Firms that were in the best-performing group at the beginning of the 1950s 
had not only higher long-run predicted profitability levels, but were also 
experiencing a slower convergence to this level. Also some firms in the top-
group had growing earnings. Companies that had projected long-run above-
normal profits in this study were among others, Coca-Cola, Gillette, Procter  
& Gamble, R.J. Reynolds or Wrigley: all names that later figured on 
Berkshire Hathaway's investment portfolio.
Yamawaki's (1989) study of both Japanese and U.S. firms shows that the 
convergence speed to the long-run predicted profit rate differs depending on 
the industry affiliation of the particular firm. Further, Waring (1996) finds 
that the differences in convergence rate of inter-industry profitability varies 
from industry to industry.
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The permanence of profits is also observed in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany (Geroski & Jacquemin, 1988), Japan 
(Odagiri & Yamawaki, 1990), Canada (Khemani & Shapiro, 1990) or 
Turkey (Yurtoglu, 2004).
Apart from detecting persistent profits, Mueller (1983, 1986, 1990) finds 
that long-run profit rates and market shares are positively correlated. Also 
he states that the study' results suggest that “the more profitable firms are 
those that succeed in differentiating their products in industries in which 
product differentiation is important” (Mueller, 1990, p. 44).
WB investment strategy aims at identifying companies that can earn 
above-average returns for an extended period of time. He searches, as he 
labels it, for valuable castles with a moat around. The literature on the 
persistence of profits shows that these valuable castles exist. A group of first 
class businesses is able to earn substantially abnormal earnings and is 
projected to persistently do so. High market shares in industries where 
product differentiation is possible is an indication for sustainable above 
average profitability. In the next section we will deal with the moat 
surrounding the castle: sustainable competitive advantage.
3.3.3 SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
What is sustainable competitive advantage? Some argue that 
competitive advantage is equivalent to above-normal profits, others define it 
as a set of different strategies and resources, with certain attributes or 
characteristics, that enable above average financial performance. We follow 
the second line of reasoning, where financial performance stems from and is 
driven by competitive advantage. A firm has a sustainable competitive 
advantage if, as Barney (1991) states: "it is implementing a value creating 
strategy that is not simultaneously being used by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits 
of this strategy" (p. 102).
The creation of sustainable competitive advantage is at the core of the 
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research in strategy management. Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth 
(LCAG) (Andrews, Christensen, Guth, & Learned, 1969) have defined four 
key elements of effective strategy formulation. In the SWOT (strength, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats) framework two key elements of the 
LCAG framework, company strengths and weaknesses, and personal values  
of key implementers are grouped together in the internal analysis quadrant. 
The other two elements, industry economic & technical opportunities, 
threats and broader societal expectations are found inside of the second 
quadrant: external analysis (see Figure 5). 
The research on competitive advantage by Porter (1984, 1985) which is 
rooted in IO and the SCPP, emphasizes more the external analysis quadrant. 
The aim is to identify industries and strategic groups where opportunities 
are great and threats are low (Barney, 1991). 
On the other hand, the resource-based view (RBV) of competitive advantage 
is concerned with the internal analysis of the SWOT framework, and where 
the main focus lies on the internal resources and capabilities of companies 
and on their necessary characteristics to achieve a competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).
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The SCPP states that industry structure determines conduct and that 
conduct consequently determines performance. This causal relationship 
enables one to solely explain performance by the industry structure. The 
factors considered essential to explain performance are “barriers to entry 
[Bain, 1972], the number and size distribution of firms, product 
differentiation, and the overall elasticity of demand [Bain, 1968]” (Porter, 
1981, p. 611).
Later, Porter (1979a) identified five forces governing competition in an 
industry and thereby contributed greatly to clarifying the concept of industry 
structure. The five forces in his analysis are “threat of new entrants”, 
“bargaining power of customers”, “bargaining power of suppliers”, “threat 
of substitute products or services” and “jockeying for position among 
current competitors”.
If we look at PF's example of a firm that has the potential for high levels of 
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Figure 5. Combination of the LCAG framework and the SWOT analysis. Adapted from 
“Organising IP Management,” by Dr. R. Pitkethly, 2004. Retreived from 
http://siweb.dss.go.th/patent/fulltext/pat_ppt/patent23.ppt 
sustained profitability, we can identify six sources that are critical to the 
strength of the company, which is also in line with Porter's forces.
“An example is a company that has created in its customers the habit 
of almost automatically specifying its products for reorder in a way 
that makes it rather uneconomical for a competitor to attempt to 
displace them. [...]First, the company must build up a reputation for 
quality and reliability in a product (a) that the customer recognizes is 
very important for the proper conduct of his activities, (b) where an 
inferior or malfunctioning product would cause serious problems, (c) 
where no competitor is serving more than a minor segment of the 
market so tat the dominant company is nearly synonymous in the 
public mind with the source of supply, and yet (d) the cost of the 
product is only quite small part of the customer's total cost of 
operations. […] Second, it must have a product sold to many small 
customers rather than a few large ones.[...]They constitute a market 
in which, as long as the dominant company maintains the quality of 
its product and the adequacy of its service, it can be displaced only 
by informed salesman making individual calls. Yet the size of each 
customer's orders make such a selling effort totally uneconomical!” 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 205)
The sources are high capital requirements and differentiation in the eyes of 
the customer (“threat of new entrants”) - fragmented customer base, 
importance of the product's quality for the buyer, and price being a small 
fraction of total costs of the buyer (“bargaining power of customers”) -   
substantially smaller competitors (“jockeying for position among current 
competitors”).
In the 1970s, where research in IO started to move its focus also on 
firm analysis, rather than only on industry analysis, Porter and Caves (1977) 
added the concept of mobility barriers. In contrast to entry barriers, which 
shields an entire industry, mobility barriers protect only the members of a 
certain strategic group within an industry. 
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The term strategic group was coined by Hunt (1972) in a study of the U.S. 
home appliance industry. Although he found that industry concentration was 
high, profitability was cheerless. Hunt reasoned that since firms were 
pursuing different strategies, market power could not be exercised.
According to Porter (1979b), a strategic group is a group of firms within an 
industry that follow similar strategies along dimensions such as their degree 
of vertical integration, diversification, breadth of product line, the extent to 
which they advertise and brand their product, distribution arrangements, or 
whether they operate regionally, nationally or multinationally. 
Porter (1979b) uses the SCPP, which aims at explaining industry 
profitability, and extends it in order to explain firm profitability by using 
Hunt's (1972) notion of strategic groups and introducing barriers to mobility.
When WB states that Richard Branson, a marketing genius, entered the soft 
drink market with Virgin Coke, but couldn't knock off Coca-Cola, he alludes 
to the mobility barriers within the soft drink industry: “The might of their 
brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their 
distribution systems” (Buffett, 1993) are the factors that shield Coke (and 
Gillette) from entrants within and outside the industry. 
These mobility barriers are what WB terms moat. Likewise Cool and 
Dierickx (1993) view them as walls protecting a medieval city. 
WB offers two paths to become a truly great business, two ways to build a 
robust and solid city wall:
The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will 
repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. 
Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company being the low-cost 
producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide 
brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for 
sustained success. (Buffett, 2007, p. 5)
Similarly, Porter (1984) defines three generic competitive strategies: cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus.
The first strategy, cost leadership, aims at being the most efficient producer  
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in the industry. This shields the company from the five industry forces, 
because buyers can only lower prices to the level of the second most 
efficient firm, the company is making profits even under intense rivalry 
between competitors, factors that enable low costs often create entry barriers 
while low prices enable the company to better cope with substitutes.
To be the cost leader in an industry calls for the buildup of production 
capacities of efficient scale and the rigorous control of costs. Companies 
should concentrate on a simple production process, where costs can be 
spread over a large line of homogeneous products and on a large number of 
customers. In many industries to gain a relative large market share is crucial 
to achieve cost leadership. The access to cheap commodities is also a 
possible avenue. 
In PF's (2003) opinion “to be a truly conservative investment a company 
[…] must be the lowest-cost producer or about as low a cost producer as any 
competitor” (p. 180). The company is then able to survive and even thrive 
during rough economic seas, where high-cost competitors have run aground 
and their markets can be seized.
WB acknowledges that being the low-cost operator is one path to 
exceptional profitability. But in contrast to PF, he favors the second strategy: 
differentiation. The major risk in investing in cost-leaders is that they need 
highly able leaders in order to navigate them through the constant canon fire 
of competition. But sooner or later mismanagement will take place and this 
could lead to perdition.
Hence the constant struggle of every vendor to establish and 
emphasize special qualities of product or service. This works with 
candy bars (customers buy by brand name, not by asking for a “two-
ounce candy bar”) but doesn’t work with sugar (how often do you 
hear, “I’ll have a cup of coffee with cream and C & H sugar, 
please”). (Buffett, 1982)
This brings us to the second strategy: differentiation. The goal of this 
strategy is to make the product or service unique in the eyes of the 
customers. This shields the company from the bargaining power of 
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customers, since differentiation leads to less price sensitivity. The 
uniqueness of the product and the customer loyalty create significant entry 
barriers for competitors and lessen the threat of substitutes. Differentiation 
entails significant investments in research and development, design, 
advertising, customer service or high quality materials.
A company that can truly differentiate what it has to offer from its 
competitors is in WB opinion a franchise; its product or service is needed or 
desired, it has no close substitute in the eye of the customer, and it isn't 
subject to governmental price regulation. The presence of an economic 
franchise is evidenced by the company's ability to price its offer 
aggressively (Buffett, 1991a): “The ability to raise prices – the ability to 
differentiate yourself in a real way, and a real way means you can charge a 
different price – that makes a great business“ (Buffett, 1991b, p. 2).
The third and last strategy is focus. Here the company aims at concentrating 
its efforts to a well-defined buying group, geographical market or product 
offering. It is a hybrid strategy, were cost leadership and differentiation are 
applied to a definite strategic target.
As Porter (1981) writes, the formulation of the concept of strategic 
groups and mobility barriers was a step toward the analysis of a company's 
weaknesses and strengths. Rumelt (1984) developed this further by 
formulating the idea of isolating mechanism. In his opinion there is no 
reason to limit barriers to entry to an industry or a strategic group. 
Individual companies from the same strategic group can also own 
heterogeneous and immobile resources that prevent returns to even out. 
The concept that firms are endowed with heterogeneous and immobile 
resources is a central assumption of the RBV of the firm, whose beginnings 
can be traced back to Chamberlain (1933), Penrose (1959), and Wernerfelt 
(1984).
According to Wernerfelt (1984) two categories of resources exist: tangible 
and intangible. Tangible resources are the physical assets a company 
possesses, such as buildings, machinery, financial or human resources. 
Intangible resources are intellectual and technological resources, as well as 
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reputation. Possible examples could be brand names, patents, copyrights, as 
well as relationships with customers and suppliers.
The RBV aims at identifying internal resources and capabilities of a firm 
that are strategic in achieving sustainable competitive advantage. For a 
resource to be able to establish and sustain competitive advantage, various 
criteria have to be met. Based on the criteria specified by Barney (1991), 
Grant (1991) and Peteraf (1993), the following properties have to be 
fulfilled.
A company can establish competitive advantage if the resources are:
• Heterogeneous: First the resource has to be rare, so that only a small 
number of companies can implement the same strategy. A rule of 
thumb is that the number of companies must be smaller than the 
number which forms the basis for perfect competition.
Second, it has to be valuable and relevant, meaning that the resource 
has to be strong enough to neutralize threats or exploit opportunities.
A company can sustain the competitive advantage if there are:
• Ex post limits to competition: If the valuable and scarce resource 
should create competitive advantage in the long-run, there ought to 
be barriers to substitution, imitation and mobility.
Clearly if a resource can be substituted or traded, then a company 
cannot harvest the fruits of its labor. Dierickx and Cool (1989) have 
pointed out that nontradable assets are candidates for sustainable 
competitive advantage generating resources. WB gives the example 
of imitable capital investments in the textile industry that don't create 
sustainable competitive advantage:
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were 
illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, 
were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once 
enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the 
baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, 
each company’s capital investment decision appeared 
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costeffective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions 
neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when 
each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if 
he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the 
players had more money in the game and returns remained 
anemic. (Buffett, 1985)
According to Dierickx and Cool (1989) “imitability depends on the 
extent to which asset accumulation processes exhibit the following 
properties: time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, 
interconnectedness, asset erosion, and causal ambiguity“ (p. 1510). 
PF incorporates the idea of interconnectedness and causal ambiguity 
when he writes:
Another [investment factor] which we believe is of particular 
interest is the difficulty of competing with a highly successful, 
established producer in a technological area where the 
technology depends on not one scientific discipline but the 
interplay of two or preferably several quite different disciplines. 
(Fisher, 2003, p. 203)
A company can appropriate the returns of its resources if there are:
• Ex ante limits to competition: If the cost of implementing a 
strategy is equal to its benefits, then a company can't achieve 
superior financial performance. The ex ante perceived value of a 
resource must be different across firms.    
• Appropriating barriers: In addition to Porter's bargaining power of 
suppliers and buyers, there is the bargaining power of employees. In 
many businesses, such as investment banking, sports or advertising 
agencies, human resources are crucial for success. If the employee is 
mobile and the contribution of his skill is both identifiable and 
transferable to other firms, he is in a good position to appropriate 
most, if not all of his contribution to the firms profit.
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Creating competitive advantage and thus earning above-normal profits 
is the goal of profit-oriented companies. To attain this, a strategy which 
incorporates all the critical factors has to be formulated. The SWOT-analysis 
differentiates between external and internal analysis. IO and Porter's five 
forces offer valuable tools to screen for possible opportunities and threats, 
whereas the RBV of the firm is useful to identify firm resources that could 
be possible strengths or weaknesses. WB's and PF's investment approach 
consists in searching companies with sustainable competitive advantage and 
their writings show similarities to the concepts mentioned above. 
In the next section we will deal with the relation between competitive 
advantage, technological change and industry evolution.
3.3.4 COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND INDUSTRY 
EVOLUTION
As opposed to the scholars of the neoclassical approach, Schumpeter, 
an Austrian economist of the twentieth century and short-time Austrian 
Minister of Finance rejected the idea of the existence of an state of 
equilibrium that would be reached, if external disruptive factors wouldn't 
prevent it.
Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction builds upon the idea that 
economic development depends on endogenous factors, which throw  the 
economy constantly out of equilibrium. He identifies the production-side as 
the driving force for economic development, where the entrepreneur 
introduces new innovations that have a major impact on the economy. 
Interestingly, Schumpeter's early work emphasizes the importance of the 
entrepreneur as an individual possessing superior personality traits, such as 
intuition and  assertiveness. Here, newly created companies enter the 
industry and oust incumbents. Later, as large companies expanded their 
R&D efforts and the process of innovation was professionalized, 
Schumpeter's work dealt with the advantages of established firms (Tripsas, 
1997).
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In both cases, the reward for an innovation is the corporate profit. However, 
it is only a temporary reward since the mechanism of competition will 
gradually erode it. Other firms will imitate the production- or process 
innovation of the pioneer and put pressure on prices (Schohl, 1992): In a 
study, Levin et al. (1987) observed that patented new products in 76 of 129 
lines of business could be copied within three years. Only in 7 cases was the 
duplication not feasible.
Based on the product life cycle theory popularized by Vernon (1966), 
Dean (1964), or Cox (1967), the dynamic evolution of industries was the 
subject of many studies.
Williamson (1975) depicted an industry as going through three different 
stages: a formative, a development and a mature stage. First an industry is 
characterized by high uncertainty, products of primitive design, low 
productivity and low sales volume. Then in the development stage 
production processes are enhanced and sales grow quickly. In the mature 
stage “management, manufacturing, and marketing techniques all reach a 
relatively advanced degree of refinement” (p. 216).
Technological progress plays a major role in the evolution of industries. 
Clark (1985), based on models developed by James M. Utterback, describes 
two technological states that an industry goes through (see figure 6). The 
fluid state is where fundamental product innovations are rapidly succeeding 
each-other. Market shares are also unstable, as newcomers displace 
incumbents. The specific state is reached after a technology has gained 
dominance and the production process lays at the center of attention, where 
“work flow is rationalized, integrated and linear; unlike the fluid and 
flexible job shop of the early period.” As opposed to the more fundamental 
character in the fluid state, the incremental dimension of innovations in the 
specific state assure that market shares are stabilized.
In an empirical study of 46 major new products, Gort and Klepper 
(1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990) distilled three different stages along 
factors such as output, prices, number of firms, number of entrants, and 
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exists (see figure 7). In the first stage the number of firms grows. The 
second stage is characterized by a shake-out, where the number of firms 
decline. In their sample, Klepper and Graddy (1990) find that relatively to 
the peak number of firms, on average 52% and in some industries more than 
74
Figure 7. Innovation cycle. An industry shifts from the fluid to the specific 
stage, when radical product innovations looses and process innovation gains 
importance. Adapted from “Patterns of Industrial Innovation”, 1978, 
Technology Review, 80, pp. 40-47.
Figure 6. Industry life cycle, that is characterized by a rise in the number of producers, 
followed by a shake-out. Typically output rises and prices fall. Omitted from this figure, 
there is often a last industry phase: decline. Adapted from “The Industry Life-Cycle of 
The Size Distribution of Firms,” by E. M. Dinlersoz, G. M. MacDonald, July 2005, 
Center for Economic Studies, Working paper 05-10, p. 50. 
80% of firms disappear. The third stage is marked by a more stable number 
of firms. In all three stages output grows and prices fall, albeit at a 
decreasing percentage rate through time.
In the first stage of the industry life cycle hypothesized by Klepper and 
Graddy (1990), they find that, accordant to the fluid state depicted by Clark 
(1985), the greatest number of fundamental innovations occur and these 
break-throughs are disproportionately made by newcomers.
According to WB, a very important lesson of the industry life cycle is that  
picking an over-performing company or even a survivor at an early stage is 
tremendously difficult. Even if new products and production processes lead 
to economic development and to more material prosperity, growth industries 
are inherently unstable and difficult to forecast:
If you’d look at the 1930s, nobody could have predicted how much 
the automobile and airplane would transform the world. There were 
2000 car companies, but now only 3 left in the US and they are 
hanging on barely. It was tremendous for society, but horrible for 
investors. Investors would have had to not only identify the right 
companies, but also identify the right time. The net wealth creation 
in airlines since Orville Wright has been next to zero. If a capitalist 
had been at Kitty Hawk and shot him down, it would have done us a 
huge favor. Or look at TV manufacturers. There are hundreds of 
millions of TV’s, RCA & GE used to produce them, but now there 
are no American manufacturers left. (Buffett, 2008)
Numerous other examples exist, where the shake-out phase was 
extremely severe and only a handful of companies survived.
During 1956 until 1990, when the rigid disk drive industry matured from a 
research project in the San Jose laboratories of IBM, Inc. to a multi-billion 
dollar industry, 109 of the 138 entrants disappeared (Christensen, 1993). 
The same destiny did befall to the majority of entrants into the computerized 
tomography scanner market, where after a decade only 5 or 6 out of nearly 
30 companies survived. Including on the list of dropouts, were such 
prominent names as Pfizer, Searle or industry pioneer EMI (Aaker & Day, 
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1986). Another example, mentioned by WB, is the television industry: The 
number of U.S. producers reached 89 in 1951, now none off them are left 
(Klepper, 1997).
Barney (1991) argues that a major threat to sustainable competitive 
advantage are unanticipated “structural revolutions in an industry – called 
'Schumpeterian Shocks'” (p. 102). These changes in technology can 
undermine previously relevant strategic resources. Therefore WB (2007) 
shuns unstable industries:
Our criterion of 'enduring' causes us to rule out companies in 
industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though 
capitalism’s 'creative destruction' is highly beneficial for society, it 
precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously 
rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all. (p. 5)
As emphasized in Schumpeter's early work, newcomers often spearhead 
new developments in the early stage of industry evolution. Scholars have 
found several causes for this phenomenon.
Gilbert and Newberry (1982) and Reinganum (1983) find that incumbents 
have less incentive to invest when technological changes are radical rather 
than incremental, because of the risk of reducing sales of existing products. 
Cooper and Schendel (1976), as well as Foster (1986), have found that 
companies often intensify their improvement efforts in the old technology 
currently used by their customers when faced by the threat of new 
technologies. Christensen and Bower (1996) in a study of the world disk 
drive industry, argue that the inappropriate resource allocation of incumbent 
firms is due to the fact that initially, the new technology can only be sold to 
new customers in an emerging market segment; but the influence of 
traditional customers' needs and demands inhibits a firm's organization to 
allocate adequate resources to the new technology. 
Adner and Snow (2009) put this into perspective by arguing that companies 
have sometimes consciously missed out new technologies. New 
technologies “reveal significant underlying heterogeneity in the old 
technology's broader demand environment” (p. 1) and this in turn creates 
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market segments where the old technology can be sold. For example Pelikan 
and Waterman still produce fountain pens even after the invention of the ball 
point pen; or Continental still produce piston aircraft engines, long after the 
emergence of turbine engines (Adner & Snow, 2009). 
Hence the inability to strategically and organizationally adapt to new 
technologies can be a source of trouble. In “The Dynamics of Standing Still: 
Firestone Tire & Rubber And The Radial Revolution” Donald N. Sull (1999) 
depicts how one of the most successful American tire companies teetered on 
the brink of bankruptcy due to “managers' existing strategic frames and 
values, and the company's processes and longstanding relationships with 
customers and employees” (p. 430). WB labels this problem the 
institutional imperative.
My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in 
business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional 
imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the 
imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I 
entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, 
and experienced managers would automatically make rational 
business decisions. But I learned over time that that isn't so. Instead, 
rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes 
into play. (Buffett, 1989)
Nonetheless, even with rationally managed organizations, radical 
technological change can cause serious challenges. As established 
companies have forged specific capabilities, procedures, and routines during 
times of incremental technological change, Tushman and Anderson (1986) 
argue that they are less flexible during periods of radical change. Core 
competencies can become “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992), leading 
to products of incumbents that are introduced later than and/or technically 
outclassed by those developed by newcomers.
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This has been observed among others for typesetters (Tripsas, 1997), 
electronic calculators (Majumdar, 1982), reduced instruction set computer 
technologies (Afuah, 1994), and the semiconductor photolithographic 
alignment equipment industry (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
The fluid state of industry evolution, which is accompanied by new 
technologies and high-growth markets are not only full of opportunities but 
also threats. The prospect of high sales growth attracts many entrants, 
although often the market can't support them, leading to a shake-out phase. 
Also, potential survivors are difficult to detect since “key success factors or 
technologies change” (Aaker & Day, 1986, p. 419). 
This is in line with arguments made by BG to not invest in growth-stocks 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 116) and by WB to not to invest in rapidly 
changing businesses environments (Buffett, 2007, p. 5).
Even though early market leaders were sometimes challenged by 
technological changes or foreign competition, Alfred DuPont Chandler, Jr., a 
graduate of Harvard College and later professor of business history at 
Harvard Business School, noticed that they sustained their position longer 
than economic theory would forebode (Teece, 1993).
Innovations made by newcomers don't always constitute a threat to 
incumbents. Companies can posses certain assets that shield them from the 
threat of new technologies: Teece (1986) determines complementary assets, 
such as “specialized manufacturing capability, access to distribution 
channels, service networks and complementary technologies” (Tripsas, 
1997, p. 122), as assets that essentially enable a company to secure the value 
of its product.
For the medical diagnostic imaging and for the typesetter industry, Mitchell 
(1989) and Tripsas (1997) respectively found that even when the newcomers 
develop technologically superior products, the sales/service relationships of 
established leaders constitute barriers to entry. Other examples where the 
innovator lost to the imitator are RC Cola, which invented Diet cola and 
ultimately lost the fight against Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Or DeHavilland, 
which invented the commercial jet, lost against Boeing (Teece, 1986). 
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Of course even complementary assets can become obsolete, as was the case 
in the transition from electromechanical to electronic calculators: 
Sales/service relationships became unimportant as the reliability of 
calculators increased, rendering office equipment dealers a possible 
distribution alternative (Majumdar, 1982).
Grant (1991) states that consumer brands and corporate reputation, in a time 
where “technological change is shortening the useful life-spans of most 
capital equipment and technological resources” (p. 124), seem to be the 
most durable and less costly competitive advantage to replace.
Further, Agarwal and Gort (2002) find that technology-intensive industries 
have lower survival probabilities for firms. Furthermore, Reed and 
Defillippi (1990) suggest that a “gradually evolving industry environment” 
(p. 94) makes barriers to imitation more valuable. This corresponds to WB 
line of argumentation:
Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are 
usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite 
similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is 
no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have 
opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing 
techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be 
seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also 
encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic 
terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is 
difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise 
is usually the key to sustained high returns. (Buffett, 1987, p. 13)
Confirming WB's statement, Mueller (1986) finds that industries with high 
growth rates and rapid change in concentration levels have higher leadership 
turnover rates than slow-growing industries marked by stable concentration 
levels.
Industries tend to evolve through different stages. The birth phase is 
often characterized by many entrants, radical innovations, volatile market 
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shares and an increasing number of competing firms. As the industry 
matures, products and companies become more entrenched, innovation 
tends to be less radical and more focused on process optimization. Market 
shares also tend to become more stable. During this transition from the fluid 
to the specific state many companies that can't compete leave the market. 
Surviving companies protect their slice of the cake against newcomers 
through their ownership of complementary assets, such as distribution 
channels or corporate reputation.
3.3.5 SUMMARY
Besides buying at a good price, WB and PF, by focusing more on 
qualitative factors, aim to buy the right company. The right company is a 
profitable business. However, a good business isn't simply one that achieves 
record earnings each year, since “an earn-more-byputting-up-more record is 
no great managerial achievement” (Buffett, 1985)13. A great business has to 
earn a good return on its invested capital for a sustained time by having 
competitive advantage.
For the classical, the neoclassical or the Austrian school of economics, 
above-normal profits are either non-existent or temporary. Contrary to this 
however, studies have shown that inter- and intra-industry profitability 
differences do subsist. The literature on the persistence of profits has proved 
in numerous studies that companies with superior economic performance do 
exist.
Competitive advantage constitutes the moat around the valuable 
castles. WB's distinction between more and less promising industries as well 
as between low-cost and differentiation strategies can be found in the 
positioning school of strategic management, which dates back to Sun Tzu's 
writings on military strategy (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1999). More 
recent work can be found in IO theories and in Micheal Porter's work on 
competitive advantage.
13 With positive interest rates and no drawings, even a bank account will produce record 
profits each year. 
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The RBV focuses on internal strength and weaknesses and on the 
characteristics that a firm's internal resource should have in order to create 
sustainable competitive advantage. WB's thoughts on durable, non-imitable 
or path-dependent resources, such as brand image and consumer reputation, 
are close connection with this concept.
Technology and industry evolution have a major impact on the 
creation of sustainable competitive advantage. Industries, before they 
mature, are often characterized by by many entrants, radical innovations, 
volatile market shares and an increasing number of competing firms. 
Eventually products and companies become more entrenched, innovation 
less radical and more focused on process optimization, and market shares 
more stable. The ownership of complementary assets, such as distribution 
channels or corporate reputation, create additional barriers against possible 
competitive assaults. Nevertheless, companies, due to managerial 
incompetence or social change are still at risk of losing their competitive 
advantage.
Both WB and PF search for sustainable competitive advantages that 
create superior economic performance. However, unlike WB, PF only 
searches for growth stocks. Even if some companies do have dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) and organizational cultures 
(Peters & Waterman, 1982) that shield them from technological change, 
such as Motorola (which PF owned for more than 25 years) (Fisher, 2003), 
WB avoids fast changing industries.
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4 ANALYSIS OF WB'S INVESTMENTS AND 
BACKTESTING OF STOCK PICKING 
FORMULA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
After studying WB's, BG's and PF's investment philosophies and stock 
selection criteria, after having put them in context with academic findings, 
the next chapter covers the empirical study.
In a first part, to answer the questions concerning the consistency 
between WB's statements and actual investment actions, data covering his 
equity investments is collected. In a second part, this data is used to 
construct a stock picking formula.  
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4.2 ANALYSIS OF WB'S MAJOR STOCK MARKET 
INVESTMENTS
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION
WB successfully managed for 12 years what today would be called a 
hedge fund, and during that time acquired a majority stake in BH. In 1965 
he was appointed Chairman of the board and later became Chief Executive 
Officer. At that time, nearly all the capital of BH was tied up in the 
subnormal profitable textile business.
In the coming years and decades, WB allocated capital away from BH's 
traditional business field, into more promising endeavors. Very early on WB 
concentrated his investments into the insurance industry and during the 
1970's put together a diverse aggregation of insurance companies. Even 
today, as BH became a widely diversified company, property and casualty 
insurance remains a major business segment.
Managing a hedge fund and a insurance company are certainly two different 
tasks, but there are also similarities. In both businesses the management of 
clients money is involved. 
For a hedge fund the reason is straightforward: it invests clients savings and 
earns fees. An insurance company manages the float. Float arises, because 
insurance premiums are paid upfront and loss events (such as car accidents 
or hurricane destruction) come up later and payment of claims occur even 
later (Buffett, 2005). If it has an underwriting profit all the gains from the 
investment of the float flow directly to the insurance company.
Thus the investment pool WB has to manage, does not only become 
larger, because subsidiaries and other investments send dividends to the 
holding company, but also because the float grows larger and larger. 
Actually it grew from $20 million in 1967 to $49 billion in 2005 (Buffet, 
2005).
Besides investments into fixed-income securities and the purchase of 
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privately held companies, WB also purchased shares of publicly traded 
companies. The latter are the subject of this analysis. 
The first two sections of this chapter will deal with the data set that is 
being used and the variables that are being studied. Then WB investments 
will be analyzed to give an overview over aspects such as growth, 
profitability or market share. Then in the last two parts I will use these 
findings to construct a stock selection approach
4.2.2 THE DATA SET
The sources for collecting BH's stock market investments are filings 
required by the Security and Exchange Commission, BH's annual reports, 
WB's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders and news releases from BH.
Security and Exchange Commission forms that convey information 
about stock market holdings include the following: 
• 10K: Annual report  
• SC 13D: Form required to be filed if a person or group of 
persons hold more than 5% of a voting class of a 
company’s equity securities
• 13F: Quarterly holdings report filed by institutional 
managers 
• SC 13G: Similar to SC 13D, but less information requirements  
• 3,4,5: Forms required to be filed by corporate insiders 
and/or persons owning more than 10% revealing their 
ownership level.         
The trouble with these forms is that the purchase price data misses.  
Fortunately this data can be found for a selected group of companies on 
WB's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders.
These letters are published yearly since 1971, when WB became chairman 
of the board of BH. And since 1977, they contain a list summarizing the 
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equity holdings as of the end of the business year. The list contains 
information about companies names, the number of shares owned, the cost 
and the market value of those shares. The criteria for inclusion of a given 
investment in these letters is the market value. In the letter covering the 
business-year 1976 all “equity holdings with a market value of over $3 
million” (Buffett, 1976) were listed. In 2008 the threshold was raised to 
$500 million per investment position (Buffett, 2008). Thus not all equity 
holdings for a given year are included.
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, BH has made more than 335 
equity investments. But because of the aforementioned lack of purchase cost 
data, we limit our analysis to a small sample of different equity investments. 
On one hand these are equity holdings covered by WB's Letters to Berkshire 
shareholders and on the other hand public companies that were taken private 
by BH. For the latter offer prices are found in the respective press release on 
BH's internet homepage.
Since “the top five holdings [of BH's portfolio account on average for] 73% 
of the portfolio value” (Martin & Puthenpurackal, 2008) and the list on 
WB's Letters to Berkshire shareholders covers on average more than 5 
investment positions, the data sample should be satisfactorily. 
Securities obtained because of a merger, an acquisition or a spin-off 
are not included in the study. This is for example the case for 
Procter&Gamble, since those shares were obtained by BH because of 
Procter&Gamble's acquisition of Gillette in 2005. Or for example shares of 
Ameriprise Financial, because it is a spin-out of American Express also in 
2005. The reason is that we only want to include companies that were 
chosen directly by WB as investment targets.
The investments in M&T Bank, Gillette, American Express, GEICO and 
Alcoa have all been made, either fully or partially, by purchasing hybrid 
securities. These securities had both equity and debt features.
The initial investments in American Express, GEICO and Alcoa through 
hybrid securities are accompanied by common stock purchases. These stock 
acquisitions are used for our study. 
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Investments solely through preferred shares in M&T Bank and Gillette  
have known conversation dates. The common stock closing price at the day 
of conversion is used as purchase price.
After having defined the investments to analyze, the next step is to 
collect financial data. I used the “Industrial Annual” file from the 
COMPUSTAT database, which is composed of 26,945 different companies 
and covering years from 1950 to 2006 ("Compustat North America"). 
Historical information about the companies is collected from their 
respective annual reports or from the International Directory of Company 
Histories. Finally news articles relating to company events are searched in 
ABI/Proquest and LexisNexis Academic databases.
If the purchase year of an investment was for example 1980, we assumed 
that financial results for 1979 were available. For some investments not all 
data was obtainable, so the data set is not complete. 
4.2.3 THE VARIABLES
In this section the variables that are being studied will be presented 
(see table 6).  
Sales Growth measures the growth in sales during the last ten years.
Capital growth measures the growth in capital during he last ten years.
Earnings growth measures the growth in earnings during the last ten years.
Payout ratio measures the share of distributed earnings during the last ten 
years.
Interest coverage measures the how many times interest expenses are 
covered by EBIT
Market share measures the share of sales a company has in a given industry 
(only calculated if the industry has more than 3 members).
Market share change measures the percentage of market share gain or loss 
in the last ten years.
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Market share stability measures the sum of market share changes in an 
industry during the last ten years.
ROC deviation measures the variability of return on invested capital rates 
during the last ten years.
ROE deviation measures the variability of return on equity rates during the 
last ten years.
Negative earnings is the sum of years with negative earnings during the last 
ten years.
ROE measures the average return on equity during the last ten years.
ROC measures the average return on invested capital during the last ten 
years.
Operating margin measures the share of sales a company earns as profits 
before interest and tax expenses. 
SGA margin measures the share of sales a company spends for sales, 
general and administrative expenses.
Gross margin measures the share of sales a company earns after paying cost 
of goods sold.
Asset turnover measures the amount of sale achieved per capital invested.
P/E measures stock price in relation to earnings per share.
P/E-10 measures the stock price in relation to average earnings per share 
during the last ten years. 
PE/PE-average measures the change in average P/E during the last ten 
years.
P/B measures the stock price in relation to book per share
The DVI indicator shows the degree of under- or overpricing based on the  
Gordon growth model developed by Gordon and Shapiro in 1956 (CFA 
295), which calculates the value of a company based on three inputs: the 
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required rate of return (r), growth (g) and the current dividend amount (D). 
The formula is: 
The dividend model is suited to value companies that are in a stable 
growth phase and pay out dividends, in line with the stock selection 
criterion that are used in this study.
The growth rate is calculated using the average payout ratio and the average 
return on equity of the last ten years. 
The average instead of the current rates are used in agreement with BG's 
advice (refer to section 2.2.2). 
The DVI is calculated using a required rate of return (r) of 15%. It is higher 
than the average historical return on stocks of 10.2% (Damodaran, 2012) in 
order to assure an adequate safety margin. The thereby estimated value is 
compared to the price of a stock.
The MOI is calculated according to the concept BG lays out in the II. He 
reasons that a stock is cheap if it is “selling for less than the amount of 
bonds that could safely be issued against its property and earning power” 
(Graham & Zweig, 2003, p. 513). Thus I calculate the interest expense that 
an investor would have to pay if he would buy the entire company using 
only debt. I assume that the interest rate is equal to the Moody BAA rates. 
This interest cost plus the original interest expense is then compared to the 
operating profit after depreciation in order to calculate a hypothetical 
interest coverage ratio. 
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Growth=(1−Payout )∗ROE
DVI=
V o
Price0
V o=
D1
r−g
MOI= (ROC∗Invested Capital)
(Market capitalization∗MoodyBAA)+ Interest expense
The aforementioned past return deviation measures (ROC and ROE 
deviation) are added, because even though historical profitability is a good 
estimator for future profitability (see figure 8), stability has a major impact 
on the forecast accuracy.
When we rank companies according to their past earnings steadiness, we 
can clearly see that average ROE becomes a better predictor the less it 
fluctuated in the past (see figure 9). Thus even though outliers still exist, the 
risk of having future returns that are significantly less than past one's is 
becoming smaller when an investor concentrates his endeavors on 
statistically stable companies.
4.2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF WARREN BUFFETT'S 
INVESTMENTS
In this part I will study the sample of WB investments. The analysis is 
structured in eight parts, each of them illuminating an investment aspect. 
The different sections are the following: growth, distribution to 
shareholders, financial responsibility, market share, stability of returns, 
profitability, operating performance and pricing. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of ROE forecast residuals using 
historical average ROE as predictor
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Figure 9. Box plot of Forecast Errors, grouped by past ROE 
fluctuation  
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For all companies in the data set the metrics presented above are calculated. 
Then, given each statistic, depending how they performed, companies are 
assigned to ten different groups with equal number of companies (deciles)14. 
This procedure is performed on three levels: a company is measured against 
all companies of the same year, then against all companies of the same year 
and industry, and finally the industry to which a company belongs to is 
compared to other industries of the same year. Firms in the data set are 
assigned to different industries using four digit SIC codes. Industry metrics 
are calculated by taking the median of member companies if there are at 
least three members. The median is chosen instead of the mean in order to 
give less weight to outlying observations. 
With this data, histograms are constructed, where each histogram shows the 
fraction of WB investments belonging to a given decile, helping to detect if 
the sample companies show similar characteristics along the variables 
studied.
GROWTH
BG writes that investors should stay away from growth companies, 
since their valuation are often too lofty (refer to section 2.2.2). As noted in 
section 3.2.4 these valuation errors may be due to representativeness. 
In the same tone WB writes that picking the right company in a growth 
industry is tremendously difficult, given their inherent economic instability 
(refer to section 3.3.4). This contrasts with PH investment philosophy of 
picking companies with high earnings growth potential (refer to section 
2.3.2). 
Even though sales, capital or earnings growth rates of the sample companies 
show no clear tendency at first glance, there are some modest hints. First, 
when looking at industry growth rates, the histograms are skewed to the 
right, which might indicate that WB prefers growing industries. But at the 
same time quasi no company's industry belongs to the tenth decile, the 
highest growing group. This could be interpreted as a sign that he keeps 
14 Deciles are similar to quantiles, but they differ from each-other, since deciles divide a 
sample into ten equally numerous subsets, whereas quantiles are composed of four groups. 
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away from the cigar but investments favored by him in the past and focusing 
his investments more toward promising companies, but at the same time 
following BG advice of not investing in the fastest growing and thus riskiest 
companies (refer to section 2.2.1 and 2.4.1). Of course there are exceptions, 
such as high growing companies like ConocoPhillips (10 year average 
revenue growth of 28%) or HCA (38%) and slow growing firms as 
Anheuser-Busch (2%) or Russell (2%).
The earnings growth rates supports this interpretation, and also indicates 
that WB values earnings growth more than sales or capital growth, since the 
earnings growth histogram is more skewed toward the right side. This could 
be sign that WB invests in companies that improve profit margins or asset 
turnover rates. 
Connected with growth rates are distribution to shareholders, since most of 
the time growth necessitates capital investments, which are often financed 
with undistributed profits.
DISTRIBUTION TO SHAREHOLDERS
BG valued dividend payments more than PF. WB simply stated that 
if cash can not be invested profitable, then it should be returned to owners 
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Figure 10. Growth histograms
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GROWTH
(refer to section 2.4). Payout ratios can thus show how reluctant 
management is to distribute cash and/or in what stage the industry is. 
The companies WB invests in distribute a high proportion of their earnings 
to stockholders either through dividend payments or stock repurchases. Not 
only do they have high payout ratios compared to all firms in the data set, 
but also to peer companies (Coca-Cola, H&R Block). The fact that the 
companies operate in industries where dividends and stock repurchases are 
high is another piece of evidence that WB invests in mature industries 
(Food and Kindred Products, Malt Beverages or Paints, Varnishes & 
Lacquers). Additionally the presence of dividends facilitates and adds more 
reliability to the valuation process. 
FINANCIAL STRENGTH
WB, BG and PF have stated that they are searching for companies 
which are not using excessive leverage. 
The data confirms this attitude toward risk, since more than 80% of his 
investments have above average interest coverage ratios. This is due to the 
fact that WB chooses financially strong companies when compared to peer 
companies15.
15 The interest coverage is a good measure of financial strength, since it indirectly takes 
into account how efficiently companies are putting their capital to work. 
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Figure 11. Payout histograms
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PAYOUT RATIO
MARKET SHARE AND STABILITY
One often cited aspect of WB stock selection is his focus on 
successful companies with the potential to earn sustainable above-average 
profits. As shown in section 3.3.2 high market shares and the potential to 
earn long-run profits above the norm are often linked. Apart from high 
market shares, the degree of stability of market shares within an industry 
carries information about the industry stage, and thus about the degree of 
competition (see section 3.3.3).
The investments in the sample show unambiguous tendency of having high 
market shares in their industry. More than 60% of companies belong to the 
top two deciles. These are familiar names such as Interpublic Group, Times 
Mirror or Wal-Mart. Even when market shares are compared to all other 
companies - not only to competitors, they are higher than average.    
WB has also a disposition of investing in companies with stable market 
shares. The histogram dealing with industry market fluctuation indicates that 
WB also invests in very unstable industries, which is something not 
expected16.
16 The measure of market share change should be taken with caution, since IPO and 
delistings of companies can strongly affect it, even when no real changes took place.   
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Figure 12. Interest coverage histograms
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INTEREST COVERAGE
STABILITY OF RETURNS
To see whether WB searches for companies that have stable returns on 
capital or equity I studied the dispersion of returns. There is clear-cut 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis. This characteristic is most visible when 
return dispersion of the investments is compared to peer companies. But 
also when measured against the whole universe of companies or when 
industries are studied the returns tend to be stable.
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Figure 13. Market share histograms
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MARKET SHARE
Figure 14. Profitability stability histograms
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STABILITY OF PROFITABILITY
When measuring stability by a more simple and straightforward way, 
namely the number of negative earnings during the last ten years, the 
evidence is as well overwhelming. There is crystal clear evidence that WB 
shuns companies and industries that had negative earnings in the past. Of 
course there are exceptions such as USG, which WB bought when it was at 
the brink of bankruptcy due to asbestos related personal injury costs. 
Another famous case is WB's investment in GEICO during 1976, when the 
auto insurer was forced to sell common and preferred stock to ensure its 
survival.
PROFITABILITY
WB has often stated that the main requirement a business has to 
satisfy in order for him to consider an investment, is to use its assets 
efficiently and have high profitability rates (refer to section 2.4.2) .
It is no surprise to see that most of his investments and their respective 
industries belong to the above average performing deciles, independently of 
the return measure or peer group considered. There are companies that 
operate in top performing industries and are as well performing greatly such 
as Dun & Bradstreet (Credit Reporting Agencies), but also great companies 
earning well in below average industries (Clayton Homes in the Mobile 
Homes industry ).  
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Figure 15. Negative earnings histograms
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RISK OF HAVING A LOSS
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Most firms have better operating performance then their peer 
companies. This is reflected in the histogram dealing with SGA (selling, 
general and administrative) expenses, which is skewed to the left (low SGA 
expenses relative to revenues) and the histograms dealing with operating 
margins and gross margins, which are skewed to the right. A company that 
belongs to the top performers when measured by SGA expenses and that has 
often been cited by WB for its superb management is Capital Cities. We can 
see that margins more than asset turnover rates are responsible for the 
excellent profitability of WB investments.
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Figure 16. Profitability histograms
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PROFITABILITY
PRICING
When looking at the P/E, the PE/PE-average or the P/B ratio, it becomes 
clear that WB doesn't only invest in companies which are cheap. Since his 
investments show above-average profitability, he also spends more than 
average per book value acquired. The P/E-10 histograms suggest that WB 
tendentiously favors moderately priced industries.
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Figure 18. P/E histograms
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PRICE TO EARNINGS
Figure 17. Operating performance histograms 
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OPERATING METRICS
The final set of valuation metrics are the MOI and the DVI. Both indicate 
that WB buys cheaply priced companies. This is related to the fact that the 
MOI favors conservatively financed companies and the DVI favors dividend 
paying companies.
Summing up, WB invest in companies that are market leaders and 
have high and stable market shares. They had averagely growing sales and 
capital, but slightly above average growing earnings. In addition to this, 
they are conservatively financed and had very low proportion of negative 
earnings in the past. They have high and stable returns on equity and capital, 
which is partially due to the low SGA expenses and high operating margins. 
All those aspects are no surprises, but are in accordance to WB statements.
It is unexpected to see that WB invests also in high priced companies when 
measured by the P/E ratio. And it seems that the MOI and the DVI are better 
indicators to assess whether a security is a bargain in WB's opinion.
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Figure 19. P/B histograms
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PRICE TO BOOK
4.2.5 BUILDING A PORTFOLIO 
In this section important factors to WB's investment approach are 
used to build a selection procedure, which identifies stocks with high future 
returns and low downside risk. The variables used are the companies 
MARKET SHARE rank, the NEGATIVE YEARS rank, the PAYOUT RATIO rank, past 
ROC FLUCTUATION rank, the ROC rank, the DVI and the MOI17. 
I choose these variables, because they have been found to be important to 
WB's stock selection procedure.
I prioritize the valuation metrics MOI and DVI, in order to find statistically 
cheap companies, the PAYOUT RATIO, the ROC FLUCTUATION, as well as the 
NEGATIVE EARNINGS variable to find mature and stable companies. The 
MARKET SHARE and the ROC variable are used to select market leaders.
In a first step they are used to pick out stocks from the COMPUSTAT 
database in the period 1975 - 2011. Stocks are selected at the beginning of 
each year. The most recent financial data supposed to be available is that of 
17 Only overall ranks (vs. all companies of the same year) are used. Also the  MARKET 
SHARE rank used is the overall rank, since the companies picked should not only be 
market leaders, but also have high market shares.
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Figure 20. DVI & MOI histograms
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OTHER VALUATION METRICS
the companies last accounting year ending before October of the selection 
year.
The selected stocks are then taken to build two portfolios with different 
allocation restrictions. The average return, the Sharpe-ratio18, the Sortino-
ratio19, the maximum loss per year and the amount of years with negative 
returns are compared to those of the S&P500 index.
The exact stock selection criteria are:
• PAYOUT RATIO deciles > 4 
• NEGATIVE EARNINGS decile = 1 
• ROC FLUCTUATION deciles < 5 
• MARKET SHARE deciles > 7
• ROC deciles >6
The cutoff values are chosen, so that at least three quarters of WB's 
investments fall into each bandwidth. 
• DVI > 0.5
• MOI > 1.5
These variables are used in conjunction with the DVI and the MOI, where 
instead of selecting companies by their rank assignment, absolute values are 
used, because otherwise the strategy could eventually lead to buying the 
cheapest companies in a generally overvalued market.20 The cutoff values 
used are the median values observed for WB investments. Demanding a 
DVI and a MOI higher that the observed median values, should increase the 
conservativeness of the stock picking approach.
There are 823 stocks that fulfill the requirements. The average one year 
18 The Sharpe-ratio is a measure of performance, which relates average returns to risk 
incurred. Return is the annual stock price increase plus the dividend yield after 
subtracting the risk-free rate. Risk is measured by the standard deviation of returns.
19 The Sortino-ratio resembles the Sharpe-ratio, but on one hand the hurdle rate is not the 
risk-free rate, and on the other hand only returns below that hurdle-rate are taken for the 
calculation of risk. 
20 Rank assignment are constructed by comparing companies in a given year. Thus being a 
member of the cheapest valuation decile, doesn't necessarily mean  that a company is a 
bargain. It could be that all companies at that point in time were overvalued. 
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return of those stocks is 20% and the median return is 14%. Approximately 
one quarter has negative returns, with the lowest return being -93%.
The stocks average ranking by the other valuation ratios (P/E, P/E-10 and 
P/B) and the fact that the companies are all mostly large firms show that the 
strategy is different from traditional VP portfolios. 
To compare the selected stocks to a recognized stock index such as the 
S&P500, two portfolios with different allocation restrictions are build.
Both portfolios restrict the maximum allocation per stock to 20%, the 
second portfolio additionally restricts the minimum allocation per stock to 
5%. Hence, if more then 20 stocks are picked in a given year, the 20 stocks 
with the highest DVIxMOI values are used to build the second portfolio. 
This is in line with PF's and WB's idea of abstaining from over-
diversification. Both portfolios outperform the S&P500, have a lower 
number of negative return years and higher reward for variability, as 
indicated by the Sortino ratio21 and the Sharpe-ratio (see table 3).
When looking at the recent performance, the S&P500 performs better 
during the 1990's with a ten year average return of 18.8% vs. 11.3% for the 
stock picking strategy. During the bear market beginning in 2000, the 
selection approach outperforms the stock market by a wide margin and 
21 The Sortino ratio is calculated with a 0% hurdle rate
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Table 2. Stock selection approach without market share & ROE
Stock picking criterion
MOI DVI-15
> 1.5 0.5 > 4 < 5 =1 >6 >7
Selected Statistics
Return P/E ratio P/E-10 ratio P/B ratio 
1 Year Values Rank Values Rank Values Rank Rank
Mean 20.3% 8.6 5.4 9.8 5.0 1.4 5.9 8.7
P25 -0.3% 6.3 4 7.2 4 0.9 4 8
Median 14.5% 7.8 5 9.5 5 1.1 6 9
P75 36.1% 9.7 7 11.6 6 1.6 7 10
Lowest Return 
Amount 823 208 -93%
Payout 
decile
ROC 
fluctuation 
decile
Negative 
earnings 
decile
ROC 
decile Marketshare decile
Marketcap 
Number of stocks 
selected
Number of negative 
Returns
improves its ten year average return to 12%, whereas the S&P500 drops 
three years in a row and shows a ten year average return of 11% at the end 
of 2002. The worse period for the stock selection approach and for the 
S&P500 is from 1999-2008 with an average return of 7.7% for the two 
portfolios and 0.7% for the S&P500 (see table 5 in the appendix). Both the 
Dot-com bust and the Financial Crisis of the late 2000s occurred during this 
time period.  As opposed to the bear market after the Dot-com bubble, 
where the portfolios achieve positive returns while the S&P500 dropped, 
during 2008, in the midst of the Financial Crisis, the stocks perform even 
worse than the S&P500. Still for the three years after the crash, the 
portfolios show excellent returns and make up for the previous losses. 
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Table 3. Portfolio performance measured vs. S&P500
Portfolios / Statistics
Portfolio 17.2% 15.2% 0.55 6 -41.3% 2.4
18.6% 16.3% 0.56 6 -41.3% 2.6
S&P 500 Index 12.8% 11.5% 0.45 7 -36.6% 1.8
Arithmetic 
mean
Geometric 
mean
Sharpe 
ratio
Number of 
negative 
Years
Lowest 
Return
Sortino 
ratio
Portfolio with diversification 
restriction
Figure 21. Portfolio performance vs. S&P500
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4.2.6 SUMMARY
WB's investment approach is certainly to complex to model it with a 
few variables, maybe to complex to model it at all. Decades of investment 
experience, in depth knowledge spanning various classes of businesses, 
access to arguments and opinions of brilliant managers: one cannot hope to 
substitute this with easily available information.
An advice emphasized by WB is that an investor should stay in his circle of 
competence. The same holds for this stock selection approach, which 
competence is to find statistically cheap companies by focusing on dividend 
paying, market leading and financially strong companies: attributes that are 
observable for WB's own investments. 
The literature on the VP proved that on aggregate stocks with low P/E or 
P/B ratios perform better that their counterparts. Thus screening the stock 
market for cheap companies based on these metrics provides an investor 
with a set of companies in which he can either invest in, or use as a starting 
point to do further research. On one hand the results of the screening 
approach developed in this thesis indicates that the pool of stocks selected 
also performs satisfactorily when measured against the S&P500, thus 
providing an investor with a further tool to locate promising investment 
opportunities. The greatest difference to previous VP portfolios is that the 
companies picked here are market leaders and thus mostly large companies. 
Another difference is the employment of two valuation metrics not used in 
the VP literature: the MOI and the DVI. On the other side studying the 
investments of other successful investors, such as Peter Lynch or Seth 
Klarman, might be a fertile ground for further stock screening approaches.
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APPENDIX 
Table 4. Formulas
Profitability Stability Market position Valuation Growth
Metric Formula Metric Formula Metric Formula Metric Formula Metric Formula
Market share P/E
P/E-10
Payout Financial Strength
Metric Formula Metric Formula
Interest coverage
Average return 
on capital last 
10 years
Coefficient of 
variation of 
return on 
capital
Average 
capital growth 
last 10 years 
Average return 
on equity last 10 
years
Coefficient of 
variation of 
return on 
equity
Market share 
change
Present to 
past P/E
Average sales 
growth last 10 
years
Amount of 
negative 
years
Industry market 
share instability
Average 
earnings 
growth 
Payout ratio 
last 10 years
∑
t−9
t
EBIT
∑
t−9
t
Invested capital
∑
t−9
t
Income before extraordinary items
∑
t−9
t
Common equity
Standard deviation (ROC)
mean(ROC)
Sales t
∑
company=1
j
Sales tj
market sharet−market share t−10
∑
1
j
∑
t−9
t
market share change tj
PE
(∑
t−4
t
PE∗1
5
)
Average price t
Earnings per sharet
negative year=1 if
Incomebefore extraordinary item<0
∑
t−9
t
negative year
(
Invested Capital t
Invested Capital t−5
)
(1/10)
(
Sales t
Salest−10
)
(1 /10)
Average price t×10
∑
t−9
t
(Earnings per share t)
Standard deviation (ROE )
mean(ROE)
∑
t−9
t
(Dividends+Share repurchase )
∑
t−9
t
Income before extraordinary items
EBIT t
interest expenset
(
∑
t−2
t
Income before extraordinary items
∑
t−9
t−7
Income before extraordinary items
)
(1/7)
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Table 5. Portfolio and S&P500 returns
Year
Return – 1 year Return – 10 year average
Portfolio Portfolio 
1975 80.0% 94.1% 34 37.0%
1976 35.1% 37.4% 27 23.8%
1977 5.6% 7.2% 36 -7.0%
1978 1.7% 9.0% 93 6.5%
1979 16.0% 15.9% 104 18.5%
1980 16.2% 19.4% 91 31.7%
1981 14.9% 17.4% 45 -4.7%
1982 34.0% 34.1% 27 20.4%
1983 39.2% 38.5% 25 22.3%
1984 6.7% 6.7% 11 6.1% 24.9% 28.0% 15.5%
1985 38.8% 40.8% 25 31.2% 20.8% 22.6% 14.9%
1986 15.7% 15.7% 13 18.5% 18.9% 20.5% 14.4%
1987 6.3% 6.3% 17 5.8% 19.0% 20.4% 15.7%
1988 29.0% 29.0% 14 16.5% 21.7% 22.4% 16.7%
1989 11.3% 11.3% 5 31.5% 21.2% 21.9% 17.9%
1990 -7.0% -7.0% 8 -3.1% 18.9% 19.3% 14.5%
1991 49.6% 49.6% 12 30.2% 22.4% 22.5% 18.0%
1992 8.4% 8.4% 4 7.5% 19.8% 19.9% 16.7%
1993 6.3% 6.3% 4 10.0% 16.5% 16.7% 15.4%
1994 -2.7% -2.7% 12 1.3% 15.6% 15.8% 15.0%
1995 18.2% 18.2% 6 37.2% 13.5% 13.5% 15.5%
1996 20.9% 20.9% 9 23.8% 14.0% 14.0% 16.1%
1997 31.0% 31.0% 4 31.9% 16.5% 16.5% 18.7%
1998 -0.6% -0.6% 2 28.3% 13.6% 13.6% 19.9%
1999 -11.0% -11.0% 9 20.9% 11.3% 11.3% 18.8%
2000 16.1% 16.1% 18 -9.0% 13.6% 13.6% 18.2%
2001 35.5% 36.2% 22 -11.8% 12.2% 12.3% 14.0%
2002 6.2% 6.2% 8 -22.0% 12.0% 12.1% 11.1%
2003 30.3% 30.3% 14 28.4% 14.4% 14.5% 12.9%
2004 3.3% 3.3% 6 10.7% 15.0% 15.1% 13.8%
2005 26.4% 26.4% 6 4.8% 15.8% 15.9% 10.6%
2006 24.5% 24.5% 9 15.6% 16.2% 16.2% 9.8%
2007 -13.3% -13.3% 5 5.5% 11.7% 11.8% 7.1%
2008 -41.3% -41.3% 17 -36.6% 7.7% 7.7% 0.7%
2009 57.6% 76.5% 44 25.9% 14.5% 16.5% 1.2%
2010 15.1% 15.1% 18 14.8% 14.4% 16.4% 3.5%
2011 12.6% 12.6% 18 2.1% 12.1% 14.0% 4.9%
Portfolio with 
restriction
Number of 
stocks
S&P 500 
total return
Portfolio with 
restriction
S&P 500 
total return
ABSTRACT
ENGLISH 
This paper investigates Warren Buffett's investment philosophy by 
comparing it to the approaches of two personalities who have influenced 
him and by illuminating his investment principles in the context of 
economic science. Finally a sample of his investments is analyzed and the 
findings are used to construct a stock picking strategy.
Buffett has been most affected by the teachings of Philip Fisher and 
Benjamin Graham. The latter's Margin of Safety concept and the willingness 
to assess value independently from the whims of the stock market is central 
to Buffett's investment approach. His willingness to concentrate his 
investments in companies with excellent business characteristics is 
influenced by Fisher's advice.
The study of Buffett and his mentors leads to the research on market 
efficiency and on competitive advantage. One of the first contributors to the 
literature on the Value Premium is Graham in The Intelligent Investor, where 
he shows that cheap stocks, based on the E/P indicator, outperform the stock 
market.
Additionally Fisher's and Buffett's writings emphasize the necessity of a 
company to have a competitive advantage. The literature on the Persistence 
of Profits has proved the existence of long term over-performing firms, 
while researchers have identified factors that lead to competitive 
advantages.
The sample of companies studied show that Buffett is investing in 
companies that have above-average market shares, are financially strong,  
display excellent profitability and distribute a substantial portion of earnings 
to shareholders. The stock picking approach constructed with these findings 
indicates that investors can achieve superior investment results.
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DEUTSCH 
Diese Arbeit untersucht Warren Buffett's Investitions-Philosophie, einerseits 
indem sie mit dem Zugang zweier Persönlichkeiten verglichen wird, welche 
ihn stark geprägt haben und andererseits indem seine Investitions-Prinzipien 
mit wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen beleuchtet werden. 
Schließlich wird eine Stichprobe seiner Investitionen analysiert und die 
Ergebnisse genutzt um ein Aktien-Auswahlverfahren zu konstruieren.
Buffett wurde am meisten durch die Lehren von Benjamin Graham, sowie 
von Philip Fisher geprägt. Die Margin of Safety und die Bereitschaft Wert 
unabhängig von den Launen des Aktienmarktes festzustellen, stehen im 
Mittelpunkt von Buffett's Zugang. Die Bereitwilligkeit seine Investitionen in 
Unternehmen, welche durch ihre exzellenten Geschäftscharakteristiken 
herausstechen, zu konzentrieren, ist von den Ratschlägen Fisher's geprägt.
Das Studium von Buffett's Investitionsansatz und der seiner Mentoren führt 
zu Forschungsarbeiten über die Effizienz der Wertpapiermärkte, sowie über 
Wettbewerbsvorteile. Graham war einer der ersten Mitwirkenden der Value 
Premium Literatur, da er in seinem Buch The Intelligent Investor zeigt, dass 
günstige Aktien, gemessen an der E/P Kennziffer, den Aktienmarkt 
schlagen.
Weiters weisen Fisher's und Buffett's Schriften darauf hin, dass es 
vorteilhaft ist in Unternehmen mit Wettbewerbsvorteilen zu investieren. Die 
Persistence of Profits Literatur hat bewiesen, dass es Unternehmen gibt, 
welche über lange Perioden hinweg überdurchschnittlich rentabel 
wirtschaften, während Forscher Faktoren identifiziert haben, welche zu 
Wettbewerbsvorteilen führen.
Die Stichprobe an Unternehmen in welche Buffett investiert hat, zeigt, dass 
er in finanziell starke und sehr rentable Marktführer investiert, die im 
Vergleich zu anderen Unternehmen einen großen Teil ihres Gewinns an die 
Aktionäre ausschütten. Das Aktien-Auswahlverfahren welches mit Hilfe 
dieser Ergebnisse konstruiert wurde, deutet an, dass Investoren 
überdurchschnittliche Ergebnisse erzielen können.
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